Constitutional Threats in the E-Commerce Jungle: First Amendment and Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on Amazon Laws and Use Tax Reporting Statutes by Gaylord, Scott W. & Haile, Andrew J.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 89
Number 6 North Carolina Issue Article 4
9-1-2011
Constitutional Threats in the E-Commerce Jungle:
First Amendment and Dormant Commerce Clause




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Scott W. Gaylord & Andrew J. Haile, Constitutional Threats in the E-Commerce Jungle: First Amendment and Dormant Commerce Clause
Limits on Amazon Laws and Use Tax Reporting Statutes, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 2011 (2011).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol89/iss6/4
CONSTITUTIONAL THREATS IN THE
E-COMMERCE JUNGLE: FIRST AMENDMENT
AND DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE LIMITS
ON AMAZON LAWS AND USE TAX
REPORTING STATUTES*
SCOTT W. GAYLORD & ANDREW J. HAILE*
Internet sales continue to increase as consumers take advantage
of the convenience and price competition that e-commerce
provides. Yet, as North Carolina and other states have learned,
frequently the "lower"prices available online result from the fact
that many internet retailers, such as Amazon, do not collect sales
tax on such purchases. In fact, under United States Supreme
Court precedent, North Carolina and other states cannot require
internet retailers such as Amazon, that lack any physical
presence in a state, to collect sales tax.
But what many consumers do not know (or choose to ignore) is
that they still owe tax on their internet purchases. This tax,
known as the "use" tax, is not collected by the retailer; rather, the
individual consumer is responsible for paying this tax directly to
the North Carolina Department of Revenue. The use tax applies
at the same rate as the sales tax. As a result, North Carolinians
should pay the same amount in tax whether they buy goods at the
local store or over the internet.
As it turns out, though, most North Carolinians are not fulfilling
their use tax obligations. Given the state's ongoing budget
shortfalls, the North Carolina Department of Revenue has been
actively trying to find new ways to either force internet retailers to
collect taxes on internet sales or to increase use tax compliance
among consumers. In particular, in 2009, the Department of
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Revenue demanded that Amazon provide the identities ofNorth
Carolina purchasers and a list of the products they purchased so
that the Department of Revenue could determine each
purchaser's use tax liability. Amazon refused and filed a
declaratory judgment action in federal court alleging that the
information request violated the First Amendment rights of its
consumers. The federal district court agreed and granted
summaryjudgment to Amazon.
This article examines that decision and explores (i) the First
Amendment issues raised by the federal district court's order in
the Amazon case as well as (ii) the First Amendment and
Commerce Clause issues that would arise if North Carolina were
to enact a statute requking internet retailers to report to the
Department ofRevenue the amount ofpurchases that individual
consumers make annually. Such a statute presents significant,
though not insurmountable, First Amendment and Commerce
Clause issues. In light of the State's budget problems, we propose
that the General Assembly seriously consider enacting a use tax
reporting statute while at the same time continuing to pursue
alternative approaches to increase use tax compliance.
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INTRODUCTION
Given the rapid and sustained growth of e-commerce,' coupled
with continued budget shortfalls,2 North Carolina and other states
have looked to increase revenues by improving compliance with their
tax laws relating to internet sales. In North Carolina alone, the
amount of unpaid taxes on internet transactions in 2010 has been
estimated at $160 to $180 million.3 Nationally, the trend is even more
striking. With retail internet sales now exceeding $142 billion per
year,4 the total amount of uncollected state and local taxes owed on e-
commerce transactions in 2010 has been estimated at between $8.6
and $9.9 billion.' Thus, in these difficult economic times, the North
Carolina Department of Revenue (the "DOR") has aggressively
sought to increase collection of these taxes. As part of that effort, the
State of North Carolina has been engaged in a long-standing dispute
with Amazon.com LLC ("Amazon"), the well-known internet
retailer, over the collection and remission of taxes on internet
purchases. In this Article, we focus on that dispute to highlight the
significant constitutional barriers that limit, and in some instances
preclude, North Carolina's tax collection efforts.
1. Prior to the "Great Recession" in 2008, retail e-commerce sales volume generally
increased over twenty percent every quarter (as compared to the same quarter from the
previous year) from 2001 to 2008. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ESTIMATED QUARTERLY
U.S. RETAIL SALES (NOT ADJUSTED): TOTAL AND E-COMMERCE tbl. 4 (2010), available
at http://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/html/09Q4table4.html. This growth far
outstripped total retail sales. See id. The U.S. Census Bureau has reported that "[flrom
2002 to 2007, retail e-sales increased at an average annual growth rate of 23.1%, compared
with 5.0% for total retail sales." U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E-STATS 3 (2009), available at
http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2007/2007reportfinal.pdf. Following a dip in e-
commerce sales during 2008 and early 2009, retail e-commerce sales started recovering in
the fourth quarter of 2009 and have been up 14 to 15% each quarter since then as
compared to the same quarter of the previous year. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
ESTIMATED QUARTERLY U.S. RETAIL SALES (NOT ADJUSTED): TOTAL AND E-
COMMERCE, supra, at tbl.4; Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail E-
Commerce Sales 2nd Quarter 2010 (August 17, 2010), availableathttp://www.census.gov
/retail/mrts/www/data/html/lOq2.html.
2. For fiscal year 2011-12, North Carolina "is expected to face a $3.7 billion budget"
shortfall. FISCAL RESEARCH Div., N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, NORTH CAROLINA'S FY 2011-
12 BUDGET GAP (2010), available athttp://www.chancellor.appstate.edu/sites/default/files
/Dec 7_2010 Fiscal%20Brief_%20FY%202011-12%2OBudget%2OGap.pdf.
3. See, e.g., DONALD BRUCE, WILLIAM F. Fox & LEANN LUNA, STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SALES TAX REVENUE LOSSES FROM ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
11, 26 (2009), available athttp://cber.utk.edu/ecomm/ecom04O9.pdf.
4. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E-STATS 1 (2010), available athttp://www.census.gov/econ
/estats/2008/2008reportfinal.pdf. E-commerce now accounts for roughly four percent of all
retail sales in the United States. See id.
5. See, e.g., BRUCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 11, 26.
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In particular, Part I of the Article provides an overview of the
underlying legal issues that fostered the dispute between Amazon and
North Carolina. After explaining the current law relating to the
taxation of goods purchased over the internet, this part reviews the
practical and constitutional constraints that have limited North
Carolina's ability to increase tax compliance as well as the state's
ongoing efforts to circumvent those constraints. Part II analyzes a
recent decision of the Federal District Court for the Western District
of Washington, Amazon.com LLC v. Lay. That decision held that
the First Amendment prohibits North Carolina's attempt to improve
tax compliance by forcing Amazon, as part of an audit of the
company, to disclose to the DOR the identities and specific purchase
information of North Carolina residents.' The district court's decision
raises novel First Amendment issues in the context of the state's
exercise of its traditionally broad taxing authority. We contend that
although the First Amendment limits North Carolina's ability to
obtain the names and specific internet purchases of North Carolina
consumers, it may not prohibit North Carolina from learning the
names of and total amount purchased by North Carolinians who
might owe taxes on their internet purchases.
In Part III, we examine the constitutionality of an alternative
method that North Carolina should consider to increase tax
compliance-enacting a statute requiring internet retailers to report
the identity of and total amount purchased by their North Carolina
customers. This type of reporting statute, which might be modeled
after a similar Colorado statute, would (i) enable North Carolina to
obtain use tax information from many, if not most, remote retailers
without having to engage in the time and expense of individual
company audits and (ii) provide the DOR with the information
necessary to know whether North Carolinians are paying the taxes
they owe on internet purchases. While a reporting statute of this sort
is apt to confront serious dormant Commerce Clause' and First
Amendment challenges, we contend that North Carolina could draft
its reporting statute to minimize these alleged constitutional
6. 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
7. Id. at 1169.
8. The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall have the
power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court has interpreted
this express provision of authority to Congress to limit the states' authority to regulate
interstate commerce by negative implication. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S.
298, 309 (1992). This implicit limitation on state authority to regulate interstate commerce
is known as the "dormant Commerce Clause."
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infirmities. In particular, we argue that North Carolina's reporting
statute should explain why in-state and out-of-state internet retailers
are not similarly situated for dormant Commerce Clause purposes
and should protect the anonymity of consumers by limiting the
reporting requirements to internet retailers that do not specialize in
the sale of expressive materials.
Ultimately, we conclude that if North Carolina wants to improve
compliance with its tax laws relating to internet purchases, it must
continue to seek new methods to encourage or compel such
compliance. Moreover, given the potential First Amendment and
Commerce Clause limits on North Carolina's collection efforts, the
only solution certain to improve the problem of tax non-compliance
with respect to internet transactions may be for Congress to enact
federal legislation that allows the states to require remote retailers to
collect and remit taxes owed on internet transactions.
I. BACKGROUND: THE USE TAX COLLECTION PROBLEM
To better understand the nature of the dispute between Amazon
and North Carolina-and the constitutional issues raised by this
dispute-consider the following common situation. Suppose you live
in North Carolina and want to buy a new flat-screen LCD television.
After researching the options, you find that you can buy the television
from Amazon (with free shipping) for $1,000. You can buy the
identical television at your local electronics store for $1,077.50, which
includes all applicable North Carolina taxes.' Which one would you
buy? As North Carolina and forty-four other states have discovered,"o
for many consumers the answer is easy-the television from Amazon
because it appears to be cheaper. That is, the amount that you have to
pay initially is less if you purchase from Amazon because, under
existing United States Supreme Court precedent," North Carolina
9. This hypothetical reflects the fact that consumers frequently look at products in
local retail stores before ultimately purchasing goods online, especially major appliances,
to reduce their overall costs by avoiding the amount of uncollected sales tax. In fact,
according to statistical research by America's Research Group, 6.3% of consumers went to
see products in stores but subsequently bought the products online on Black Friday in
2010. Going to Brick-and-Mortar Stores, but Buying Online, AMERICAN PUBLIC MEDIA
(Dec. 2, 2010), http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/12/02/pm-going-to-
brickandmortar-stores-but-buying-online.
10. Only Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon do not collect
sales taxes. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTIONS IN 2009, at 5
(2010), available athttp://www2.census.gov/govs/statetax/2009stcreport.pdf.
11. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 301-02 (1992) (holding that states lack authority to require
companies with no in-state physical presence to collect use tax).
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cannot require many internet retailers (including Amazon) to collect
state and local taxes on the goods they sell.
But what many consumers do not realize-or intentionally
ignore-is that (i) North Carolina imposes a tax, called a "use tax,"
on such internet purchases that is equal in amount to the state's sales
tax, and (ii) the consumer is responsible for paying that tax. The
apparent savings in buying from Amazon, therefore, are illusory-at
least for North Carolina consumers who pay the taxes they owe. If the
consumer pays the use tax as required under North Carolina law, the
total cost of the television to the consumer is the same whether
buying from Amazon or from the local electronics store. And,
although $77.50 may not sound like a lot by itself, since 2003 North
Carolina consumers have engaged in more than fifty million
transactions with Amazon.12 Consequently, it is easy to see why the
total unpaid use taxes that North Carolinians owe on internet
purchases is estimated at more than $160 million per year.
The problem for North Carolina and other states is that most
consumers do not comply with the existing use tax laws." In fact,
estimates indicate that use tax compliance in North Carolina stands at
less than four percent.14 As a result, North Carolina is confronted with
the problem of trying to capture substantial amounts of "lost" use tax
revenues. At the same time, the state is constrained in its ability to do
so under Supreme Court precedent, which holds that states may not
constitutionally require retailers to collect sales or use tax if the
retailers have no in-state "physical presence."" North Carolina has
made several attempts to work around this constitutional constraint
and increase its use tax revenues, but so far with very limited success.
Moreover, the state's most recent attempt to increase use tax
revenues-by exercising its audit power in an effort to obtain the
identities of North Carolina customers who purchased from out-of-
state retailers-resulted in Amazon's suing the North Carolina
Department of Revenue in the Western District of Washington."
Given that the district court in that case recently held North
Carolina's detailed information request to Amazon violated the First
12. Amazon, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1158.
13. See Eric A. Ess, Internet Taxation Without Physical Representation?: States Seek
Solution to Stop E-Commerce Sales Tax Shortfall, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 893, 923 (2006)
("The Internet has changed the way the world transacts business and shares information.
It has also unwittingly exacerbated consumer tax evasion.").
14. See infra text accompanying footnotes 64-67 for an explanation of how we arrive
at this estimated use tax compliance rate.
15. Quill, 504 U.S. at 298.
16. Amazon, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1158-61.
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Amendment," North Carolina is forced to come up with new options
that conform to the requirements of the First Amendment and the
Commerce Clause but still allow the state to significantly increase its
use tax collections.
A. An Overview of the Use Tax
Although North Carolinians routinely pay taxes on their
purchases of tangible personal property, many are unaware of the
differences between-or the constitutional issues associated with-
sales and use taxes. A sales tax is a consumption tax, i.e., a tax on the
purchase of certain goods and services that is calculated as a
percentage of the purchase price of the particular goods or services.
In North Carolina, the state sales tax rate for most goods is set by
statute at 5.75%." Most counties charge an additional 2% local sales
tax, bringing the total sales tax rate in most North Carolina counties
to 7.75%.19 Although imposed on and collected by the retailer, the
sales tax "is intended to be passed on to the purchaser of a taxable
item and borne by the purchaser instead of by the retailer." 20 The
retailer, therefore, simply serves as "a trustee on behalf of the State
when it collects tax from the purchaser of a taxable item." 2 1 Retailers
generally must remit the sales tax they collect, along with a sales tax
return, to the DOR on a monthly basis.22
North Carolina, like the forty-four other states with a sales tax,
also has a use tax. 23 North Carolina's use tax, which is called a
"complementary use tax" in the General Statutes, is a tax on the use,
storage, or consumption of non-exempt tangible personal property or
services in North Carolina without regard to where the consumer
purchased the property.24 In general, the use tax applies when a
consumer purchases a good or service without paying sales tax (or
17. Id. at 1169.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4(a) (2009). The 5.75% sales tax rate was reduced to
4.75% as of July 1, 2011. Id.
19. Sales and Use Tax Rates Effective October 1, 2010, N.C. DEP'T OF REVENUE
(Sept. 30, 2010, 4:53 PM), http://www.dornc.com/taxes/sales/salesrates_ 10-10.html. A few
North Carolina counties impose an additional 2.25% sales tax, such that the total tax rate
in these counties is 8%. Id. Mecklenburg County has a 2% local sales tax rate and another





23. § 105-164.4(a); JOHN F. DUE & JOHN L. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION: STATE
AND LOCAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 245 (2d ed. 1994).
24. § 105-164.6(a).
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paying a sales tax rate that is lower than the rate in her home state).25
Moreover, the use tax rate in North Carolina is the same as the state's
sales tax rate.26 The use tax discourages residents of states with high
sales tax rates from purchasing items in other states that either charge
no sales tax or charge sales tax at a lower rate. In fact, as the Supreme
Court of North Carolina has acknowledged, North Carolina adopted
its use tax in 1937 because its sales tax, standing alone, "tended to
encourage residents to make out-of-state purchases to escape
payment of the tax."27 The use tax, therefore, imposes the same total
tax burden on purchases made out-of-state as those made in-state,
thereby eliminating the incentive for consumers to cross state lines-
or order online-to purchase goods at lower tax rates. 28 In this way,
the use tax serves as a "corollary to the sales tax."29 As one noted
commentator has explained:
[U]se taxes are functionally equivalent to sales taxes. They are
typically levied upon the use, storage, or other consumption in
the state of tangible personal property that has not been
subjected to a sales tax. The use tax imposes an exaction equal
in amount to the sales tax that would have been imposed on the
sale of the property in question if the sale had occurred within
the state's taxing jurisdiction . . . . In principle, then, the in-state
purchaser stands to gain nothing by making an out-of-state or
interstate purchase free of sales tax because it will ultimately be
saddled with an identical use tax when it brings the property
into the taxing state.30
So, for example, if a North Carolinian purchases a sweatshirt
during a trip to Alaska, which does not have a sales tax (or through
Amazon, which does not collect sales tax on purchases made by
North Carolinians), the purchaser would owe use tax to North
25. In re Assessment ofAdd'1 N.C. & Orange Cnty. Use Taxes, 312 N.C. 211, 214, 322
S.E.2d 155, 158 (1984).
26. § 105-164.6.
27. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Clayton, 275 N.C. 215, 223, 166 S.E.2d 671, 677 (1969).
28. See, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 581 (1937) ("One of [the
Washington use tax's] effects must be that retail sellers in Washington will be helped to
compete upon terms of equality with retail dealers in other states who are exempt from a
sales tax or any corresponding burden. Another effect, or at least another tendency, must
be to avoid the likelihood ofa drain upon the revenues of the state, buyers being no longer
tempted to place their orders in other states in the effort to escape payment of the tax on
local sales.").
29. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302 (1992).
30. 2 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION:
SALES AND USE, PERSONAL INCOME, AND DEATH AND GIFT TAXES AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES1 16.01[2] (3d ed. 2000).
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Carolina in the same amount as the North Carolina sales tax. The
total cost, then, would be the same as if she had purchased the
sweatshirt in North Carolina. If, on the other hand, the purchaser
bought the sweatshirt in South Carolina, which does have a sales tax,
the purchaser would receive a credit toward her North Carolina use
tax in the amount of the sales tax paid to South Carolina.' This
prevents the North Carolina purchaser from being double taxed on
the purchase. By imposing the same total tax burden on out-of-state
purchases as that imposed on in-state purchases, states protect their
tax revenues as well as the competitive position of their merchants in
relation to retailers in states with lower sales tax rates.32
Although North Carolina's sales and use taxes "taken and
applied together, provide a uniform tax upon either the sale or use of
all tangible personal property irrespective of where it may be
purchased . . . and [are] functional parts of one system of taxation,"
they differ as to the object of the tax as well as to who is responsible
for the collection and remission of the tax. A sales tax "is a tax on the
freedom of purchase"34 and is imposed on the retailer, even though
the purchaser ultimately pays the amount due. But, while states have
broad taxing authority, their power to charge a sales tax on a given
purchase is not unlimited. The transaction to be taxed must fall within
the scope of the state's taxing powers (i.e., must relate to an in-state
purchase) because if the sales tax is "applied to interstate
transactions, it is a tax on the privilege of doing interstate business,
31. See § 105-164.6(c) (allowing a full or partial credit for sales or use tax paid on an
item to North Carolina or any other state); see also 2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN,
supra note 30, 16.01[2] ("In order to avoid double taxation, every state imposing a use
tax allows a credit against its use tax for sales or use tax paid to other states."). Thus, if the
North Carolina purchaser bought the sweatshirt in a state imposing a 6.75% sales tax, she
would owe North Carolina only 1% of the purchase price in use tax. If the state of
purchase charged a 7.75% sales tax, then no use tax would be owed in most North
Carolina counties.
32. See Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 343 (1954) ("The [sales tax], a
fiscal measure of considerable importance, has the effect of increasing the cost to the
consumer of acquiring supplies in the taxing state. The use tax, not in itself a relatively
significant revenue producer, usually appears as a support to the sales tax in two respects.
One is protection of the state's revenues by taking away from inhabitants the advantages
of resort[ing] to untaxed out-of-state purchases. The other is protection of local merchants
against out-of-state competition from those who may be enabled by lower tax burdens to
offer lower prices. In this respect, the use tax has the same effect as a protective tariff
becoming due not on purchase of the goods but at the moment of bringing them into the
taxing states.").
33. Johnston v. G ill, 224 N.C. 638, 644, 32 S.E.2d 30, 33 (1944); see also Miller Bros.,
347 U.S. at 343 (explaining the complementary purposes of the sales and use taxes).
34. Johnston, 224 N.C. at 643, 32 S.E.2d at 33.
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[which] creates a burden on interstate commerce and runs counter to
the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution.""
Thus, as the United States Supreme Court has held, the
Commerce Clause prohibits states from imposing their sales tax on
every purchase that results in the shipment of goods into the taxing
state. For example, in McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co.,36 the Court held
that Arkansas could not constitutionally impose its sales tax on goods
that were purchased by Arkansas residents and shipped into
Arkansas where (i) the retailer was not qualified to do business in
Arkansas and maintained no offices in the state; (ii) the sale was
finalized in Tennessee; and (iii) title to the goods passed from the
retailer to the purchaser at the time they were delivered to a common
carrier in Tennessee." According to the Court, the transactions at
issue in McLeod involved "sales made by Tennessee vendors that are
consummated in Tennessee for the delivery of goods in Arkansas.""
As a result, given Arkansas's extremely limited connection with the
transactions, the Court held that "[flor Arkansas to impose a tax on
such transaction would be to project its powers beyond its boundaries
and to tax an interstate transaction" in violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause.39 In modern parlance, because these transactions
lacked a sufficient "nexus" with Arkansas, Arkansas could not
impose (or require the retailers to collect) its sales tax.40
But given that the goods were shipped to purchasers in Arkansas
for use, storage, or consumption in Arkansas, Arkansas could have
imposed a use tax on the purchasers, who were subject to Arkansas's
taxing power. Because "a [use] tax is not upon the operations of
interstate commerce, but upon the privilege of use after commerce is
at an end,"41 both the object of the tax (the use, storage, or
consumption of the goods) and the individuals liable for the tax (the
Arkansas purchasers) would have been subject to the taxing authority
of Arkansas. Thus, even though Arkansas could not impose its sales
35. Id.
36. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
37. Id. at 328-29.
38. Id. at 328.
39. Id. at 330.
40. Under modern Supreme Court jurisprudence, a state must have a "substantial
nexus" with a transaction before the state may impose its sales tax on the transaction. See
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274 (1977). See infra notes 45-55 and
accompanying text regarding the Supreme Court's holding that substantial nexus requires
a physical presence.
41. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582 (1937) (upholding the
Washington use tax against arguments that it unduly burdens interstate commerce).
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tax on the transactions under consideration, it could have imposed a
use tax to capture the same amount of tax revenue as if the sale had
occurred in Arkansas (subject to a credit for any sales tax paid in
Tennessee).
While imposing the use tax on the purchaser helps to bring the
tax within the state's constitutional authority, it creates a different
problem: enforcement. With the use tax, the purchaser, rather than
the retailer, must report the purchase and remit to the state any use
tax owed on the purchased items.42 But, as North Carolina has
discovered, most consumers do not report and remit their use tax
obligations. In fact, in 2008, only 2.5% of North Carolinians who filed
state income tax returns reported owing any use tax.43 As a result,
given the threat of low compliance rates due to the self-reporting
nature of the use tax, states originally sought to require retailers to
collect and remit any use taxes owed, as they do with the sales tax.
But the United States Supreme Court has held that the Commerce
Clause restraint not only prohibits states from imposing a sales tax on
certain out-of-state and internet purchases, but also precludes states
from mandating that retailers collect and remit use taxes on such
purchases."
In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,45 the Supreme Court held that
the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits a state from requiring a
retailer that has no "physical presence" in the state to collect and
remit the state's use tax.4 6 North Dakota had tried to require the Quill
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.16(d) (2009). The problem with self-reporting tax
regimes, like use taxes, has been well recognized. See Leandra Lederman, Reducing
Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78
FORDHAM L. REv. 1733, 1735 (2010) ("A core problem for enforcement of tax law is
asymmetric information.... [T]he taxpayer knows the facts regarding the relevant
transactions he or she engaged in during the tax year .... The government is forced to
obtain that information after the fact, either from the taxpayer or from third parties.").
43. See infra Table 1 p. 2028.
44. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311-13 (1992) (applying Complete
Auto's four-part test to North Dakota's attempt to require out-of-state retailers to collect
the state's use tax). In Complete Auto, the Supreme Court set forth a four-part test for
determining the validity of state taxes under the Commerce Clause. 430 U.S. at 279. Under
that test, a tax will survive a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the tax: "[1] is applied
to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3]
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services
provided by the State." Id.
45. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
46. Id. at 301-02, 312. In Quill, the Court attempted to give states and retailers
guidance as to what would constitute an in-state physical presence. Id. at 315. According
to the Court, "a small sales force, plant, or office" provides the requisite physical presence
whereas "vendors 'whose only connection with customers in the [taxing] State is by
common carrier or the United States mail'" would not. Id. (quoting Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc.
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Corporation, an office supply company, to collect use tax on
purchases made by North Dakota residents. 47 The state contended
that Quill's contacts with North Dakota created a sufficient "nexus"
to require it to collect the use tax.48 The company advertised in the
state and made annual sales of "almost $1 million" to "about 3,000
customers in North Dakota." 49 Despite these contacts, the Court
disagreed with North Dakota, finding that Quill's contacts with the
state did not create the physical presence necessary under the
dormant Commerce Clause to allow North Dakota to impose a use
tax collection obligation on the company.s0
The Quill decision reaffirmed the physical presence standard
previously introduced in National Bellas Hess v. Department of
Revenue offllinois,' a case with similar facts but decided on both due
process and Commerce Clause grounds.5 2 In reaffirming the "physical
presence" standard, the Quill Court focused only on the Commerce
Clause." According to the Court, requiring out-of-state sellers to
keep track of the tax rates and exemptions applicable in several
thousand state and local taxing jurisdictions throughout the nation
might "entangle" remote sellers "in a virtual welter of complicated
obligations," which, in turn, would "unduly burden interstate
commerce."54 In light of this concern and the Court's belief that a
"bright-line rule . . . encourages settled expectations and, in doing so,
fosters investment by businesses and individuals,"" Quillupheld the
requirement that before a state may impose a sales or use tax
v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967)). North Carolina incorporated Quills
"physical presence" standard in its statutory definition of being "engaged in business" in
the state. See § 105-164.3(9). Retailers who are "engaged in business" in North Carolina
must collect sales and use tax owed to the state. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.8. Those not
"engaged in business" in North Carolina have no such collection obligation under North
Carolina's sales and use tax statutes. Id.
47. Quill, 504 U.S. at 302-03.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 302.
50. Id. at 318-19.
51. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
52. Id. at 756. Quilldiffered from BellasHessin that Quillbased the physical presence
requirement solely on the dormant Commerce Clause. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312. By expressly
rejecting the Due Process Clause as a basis for the physical presence requirement, the
Quill Court opened the opportunity for Congress to eliminate the physical presence
requirement. See id. at 318.
53. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312-19.
54. Id. at 313 n.6.
55. Id. at 316.
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collection obligation on a retailer, the retailer must have a physical
presence in the state.5 6
After Quill, then, North Carolina could not constitutionally
require retailers that lacked a physical presence in the state to collect
and remit use taxes." Out-of-state retailers may of course voluntarily
collect and remit use taxes," but most remote retailers
understandably have declined the invitation to do so. Accordingly,
given the Commerce Clause limits on North Carolina's taxing power,
North Carolina must rely on individual purchasers to (i) self-report
their out-of-state purchases, whether made physically out-of-state, via
the internet, or through some other remote means (such as a mail-
order catalog) and (ii) pay any use taxes owed on those purchases. In
particular, North Carolinians are supposed to report on their annual
income tax returns any items of tangible personal property that they
store, use, or consume in the state if they did not pay sales or use
taxes at the time of purchase.59 Use tax payments are due at the same
time as income taxes.60 In the event that a purchaser is not required to
file an income tax return (e.g., she does not have sufficient North
Carolina taxable income to require the filing of an income tax return
56. Id. at 314, 317-18.
57. SeeN.C. DEPT. OF REVENUE, SALES AND USE TAX TECHNICAL BULLETINS § 1-1
(2008) [hereinafter SALES BULLETIN], available athttp://www.dornc.com/practitioner
/sales/bulletins/sectionl.pdf#l-1 (stating that "[e]very person outside this State who is
engaged in business in this State, as hereinafter defined, is required to register with the
Department [of Revenue] and collect and remit the tax due on all taxable tangible
personal property sold or delivered for storage, use or consumption in this State"). SALES
BULLETIN defines "[elngaged in business" as
maintaining, occupying or using permanently or temporarily, directly or indirectly,
or through a subsidiary or agent, by whatever name called, any office, place of
distribution, sales or sample room or place, warehouse or storage place, or other
place of business, for the selling or delivering of tangible personal property for
storage, use or consumption in this State, or permanently or temporarily, directly
or through a subsidiary, having any representative, agent, salesman, canvasser or
solicitor operating in this State in such selling or delivering.
Id. § 1-2.
58. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.6A (2009) ("The Secretary may enter into
agreements with sellers pursuant to which the seller agrees to collect and remit on behalf
of its customers State and local use taxes due on items of tangible personal property,
digital property, or services the seller sells. For the purpose of this section, a seller is a
person who is engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property, digital
property, or services for use in this State and who does not have sufficient nexus with this
State to be required to collect use tax on the sales.").
59. See 17 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 7B.0104(f) (2010).
60. See id.
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with the state), the purchaser must file a separate consumer use tax
return with the DOR.1
While the sales and use taxes are "complementary" 62 and should
result in the state receiving the same amount of tax revenue whether
goods are purchased from in-state or out-of-state vendors, use tax
compliance has been extremely low historically." In fact, one federal
legislator has called the use tax the "most ignored tax on the books." 64
And this seems especially true in North Carolina. According to the
North Carolina DOR, in 2008 only 109,003 individual income tax
returns, out of 4,420,156 filed, reported any use taxes owed on
purchases from out-of-state retailers. 65 Those returns reporting any
use tax due resulted in the payment of approximately $5.1 million in
use taxes. 66 But economists estimate that North Carolina purchasers
owed more than $145 million in unpaid use taxes in 2008 on internet
purchases alone.6' North Carolina taxpayers' use tax compliance rate,
therefore, appears to be less than four percent.6 s Given this extremely
low compliance rate, North Carolina has looked for other ways to
increase self-reporting and, more importantly, to require out-of-state
retailers like Amazon to collect use taxes without violating Quill or
any other constitutional requirements.
B. North Carolina's Prior Efforts to Increase Use Tax Compliance
North Carolina's recent dispute with Amazon is only the latest in
a series of attempts by the state to increase use tax compliance. To
date, those attempts can be separated into two general categories: (i)
efforts to inform North Carolina taxpayers about their use tax
reporting and payment obligations and (ii) efforts to require retailers
6 1. See id.
62. Johnston v. Gill, 224 N.C. 638, 644, 32 S.E.2d 30, 33 (1944).
63. See infra Table 1 p. 2028 for data regarding North Carolina's use tax reporting
between 2000 and 2008.
64. H.R. REP. NO. 107-240, at 37 (2001) (statement of Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner,
Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary).
65. Email from Beth Stevenson, Dir. of Pub. Affairs/PIO, N.C. Dep't of Revenue, to
Andrew Haile, Assistant Professor of Law, Elon Univ. Sch. of Law (Jan. 31, 2011, 16:25
EST) (on file with authors).
66. Id.
67. See BRUCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 11, 26. This figure does not include use taxes
owed on other forms of remote purchases from out-of-state retailers, such as mail orders.
68. Some states have even lower estimated compliance rates. See, e.g., STATE OF
CALIFORNIA BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, REVENUE ESTIMATE: ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE AND MAIL ORDER SALES 4 (2010), available athttp://www.boe.ca.gov/legdiv
/pdf/e-commerce-1 1-10.pdf (estimating California consumers' use tax compliance rate at
approximately 1.5% for fiscal year 2008-09).
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such as Amazon to collect and remit use taxes despite Quills physical
presence nexus requirement. While the former method is clearly
constitutional,6 9 the vast majority of North Carolinians still have not
changed their reporting habits in response to any educational
campaign. As a result, North Carolina has sought to force Amazon
and other remote sellers to collect the more than $160 million in use
taxes that went unpaid in 2010.70 With only limited success in those
efforts, however, the state most recently turned its focus toward
improving use tax compliance by increasing enforcement against
individual consumers. This led to the audit request by the DOR to
Amazon for information about customer purchases and, ultimately, to
Amazon's lawsuit against the DOR.
1. North Carolina's Attempt to Inform Taxpayers of Their Use Tax
Obligations
Although North Carolina has imposed a use tax since 1937, it did
not make a concerted effort to inform taxpayers about the tax until
2000. Perhaps this should not be surprising, given that all the states
bordering North Carolina have a sales tax and remote retail sales
were a modest part of total retail sales until the growth of internet
commerce during the 1990s." Consequently, North Carolina did not
have a pressing problem with use tax compliance until the end of the
1990s.
Starting with tax year 2000, North Carolina began including a
line on the state's individual income tax return for taxpayers to report
and pay use tax on goods they purchased from out-of-state retailers if
the retailers did not collect tax on the purchases.72 Presently, the
instructions to North Carolina's individual income tax form explain
that:
An individual in North Carolina owes use tax on an out-of-state
purchase when the item purchased is subject to the North
69. The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of North Carolina have
both held that use taxes are constitutional. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577,
582 (1937); Johnston v. Gill, 224 N.C. 638, 644, 32 S.E.2d 30, 33 (1944). Accordingly, there
is no constitutional barrier to North Carolina informing its citizens of their obligation to
pay such use taxes.
70. See, e.g., BRUCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 11.
71. The U.S. Census Bureau did not even start tracking e-sales data until 1999. SeeE-
Stats HistoricalData, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/archives
.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
72. See Act of July 22, 1999, ch. 341, 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 1292, 1292-95 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-269.14 (2009)) (requiring inclusion of a line on the income tax
return for reporting the amount of use tax owed).
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Carolina sales tax and the retailer making the sale does not
collect sales tax on the sale. . . . When an out-of-state retailer
does not collect sales tax, the responsibility of paying the tax
falls on the purchaser.73
In addition, to assist taxpayers, the instructions include a
"worksheet" to calculate the amount of use taxes owed on out-of-
state purchases.74 But, as the worksheet indicates, to make this
calculation, taxpayers must have receipts showing the purchase price
of all untaxed goods that the purchaser bought from out-of-state
retailers during the previous year." Recognizing that very few
taxpayers actually keep individual purchase receipts, the instructions
also contain a second "worksheet" for "taxpayers who do not have
records of all out-of-state purchases."7 6 This second worksheet
estimates the amount of use taxes that an individual taxpayer owes
based on the taxpayer's North Carolina taxable income. Specifically,
the worksheet presumes that taxpayers owe 0.0675% of their taxable
income in use taxes. 8 For example, a taxpayer with $50,000 of North
Carolina taxable income is presumed to have a use tax liability of $34.
Given the current combined state and county sales tax rate of 7.75%
applicable in the majority of North Carolina counties, the DOR
estimates that a taxpayer with $50,000 of taxable income spends $439
annually on taxable purchases for which the retailer does not collect
tax.
The inclusion of a use tax reporting line on the state's income tax
form has had, at best, only a modest effect on North Carolina's ability
to collect use taxes. In fact, based on information from the DOR
illustrated in the table below, the number of taxpayers who report any
use tax liability as compared to the number of total returns filed
73. N.C. DEP'T OF REVENUE, NORTH CAROLINA INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM D-400, at 8 (2010), available athttp://www.dornc.com
/downloads/D401.pdf.




78. Id. at 8-9. According to the DOR, the 0.0675% estimate for use taxes was arrived
at after "compar[ing] the information used in other states and [making] adjustments for
the combined North Carolina state and local rates of tax." Frequently Asked Questions
About Use Tax, N.C. DEP'T OF REVENUE, http://www.dornc.com/faq/use.html (last visited
Aug. 22, 2011).
79. This figure is calculated by dividing the estimated use tax ($34) by the combined
state and county sales tax rate (0.0775).
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actually has decreased during the last decade even though the volume
of internet transactions has continued to increaseso:
Table 1: NC Use Tax Reporting
2000 162,352 4,153,648 3.9%
2002 136,763 4,487,803 3.0%
2004 127,944 3,632,093 3.5%
2006 117,86 3,3,165 3.0%
2007 Ill35 978.778 2.8%
2008 109,003 4,420,156 2.5%
Given the ubiquity of e-commerce and the fact that Amazon
alone has engaged in over fifty million transactions with North
Carolina customers since 2003," it strains belief that only 2 to 4% of
North Carolinians annually engage in internet transactions for which
the retailer collects no sales tax.82 Accordingly, because including a
use tax reporting line on the income tax form has proven largely
ineffective, North Carolina has attempted to work around Quill and
shift the tax collection burden to out-of-state retailers.
2. The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement
North Carolina and most other states initially sought to work
around Quills physical presence standard by imposing use tax
80. Emails from Beth Stevenson, Dir. of Pub. Affairs/PIO, N.C. Dep't of Revenue, to
Andrew Haile, Assistant Professor of Law, Elon Univ. Sch. of Law (Jan. 31, 2011, 16:25
EST and Feb. 4, 2011, 10:07 EST) (on file with authors).
81. Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1158 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
82. A Nielsen study from 2008 found that 94% of Americans had made a purchase
over the internet at one time or another. THE NIELSEN Co., TRENDS IN ONLINE
SHOPPING: A GLOBAL NIELSEN CONSUMER REPORT 2 (2008), available at
http://id.nielsen.com/news/documents/GlobalOnlineShoppingReportFeb08.pdf.
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collection obligations directly on out-of-state retailers through the
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Project." Between 2000 and 2002,
representatives from North Carolina and forty-three other states,8 4
the District of Columbia, local governments, and the business
community, drafted the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement
("SSUTA"). The SSUTA was specifically intended to address the
concerns the Court identified in Quill by simplifying the complex
patchwork of state and local sales and use tax laws existing
throughout the country." In Quill, the Court emphasized the burdens
imposed on interstate commerce by requiring out-of-state retailers to
collect use tax on behalf of the thousands of state and local tax
jurisdictions that exist in the United States." Based in part on this
potential "undu[e] burden" on interstate commerce, the Court
prohibited states from forcing retailers without an in-state physical
presence to collect use taxes."
To avoid this dormant Commerce Clause problem, the SSUTA
sought to increase the uniformity of the sales and use tax laws around
the country, thereby reducing the burden imposed on interstate
commerce that might result from requiring remote retailers to collect
and remit taxes. Specifically, under the SSUTA, each of the parties to
the agreement-the "member states""-agreed to enact legislation
with: uniform tax base definitions; "uniform and simpler exemption
administration;" simplified rate structures; "state-level administration
of all sales taxes;" uniform "sourcing" standards;" and "state funding
of the administrative cost" of collecting sales and use taxes.90 By
implementing the SSUTA, member states hoped not only to mitigate
the burden on interstate commerce identified by the Court in Quill
but also to persuade Congress to exercise its Commerce Clause
authority to pass federal legislation permitting member states to
83. See2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 30, at T 19A.01[l].
84. The only state with sales and use taxes that did not participate in the drafting of
the SSUTA was Colorado.
85. See2 HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 30, at T 19A.01[l].
86. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 n.6 (1992).
87. Id.
88. STREAMLINED SALES& USE TAX AGREEMENT § 801 (2010), availableathttp://
www.streamlinedsalestax.org/uploads/downloads/Archive/SSUTA/SSUTA%20As %20A
mended%2012_13_10.pdf (setting forth the procedures by which states may become
member states).
89. "Sourcing" determines the location where a sale is taxable. Id. § 301.
90. See Frequently Asked Questions, STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING
BOARD, INC., http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=faqs (last visited Aug.
22, 2011).
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require out-of-state retailers to collect use tax.9 1 The Court
acknowledged Congress's power to enact such legislation in Quill:
This aspect of our decision [affirming the physical presence
standard] is made easier by the fact that the underlying issue is
not only one that Congress may be better qualified to resolve,
but also one that Congress has the ultimate power to resolve
[under the authority granted to it in the Commerce Clause]. ...
Accordingly, Congress is now free to decide whether, when,
and to what extent the States may burden interstate mail-order
concerns with a duty to collect use taxes. 92
Thus, although member states lack the inherent authority to
force retailers with no in-state physical presence to collect sales and
use tax on the states' behalf, Congress has such authority pursuant to
its Commerce Clause power.93
Yet, despite member states' efforts to reduce the complexity and
administrative burden of use tax collection, Congress has so far
declined the invitation to act. On several occasions, Congress has
considered proposed legislation that would permit SSUTA member
states to require use tax collection by out-of-state retailers.94 Each
time, though, the legislation faced stiff opposition from internet and
other remote retailers and failed to secure the necessary votes. Thus,
the SSUTA has not yet achieved its goal of persuading Congress to
enact federal legislation that would reverse Quill and allow SSUTA
member states to require out-of-state retailers to collect use taxes.
91. Id. SSUTA member states also hoped that the increased uniformity of sales and
use tax statutes among tax jurisdictions would persuade remote retailers voluntarily to
collect use tax. It has succeeded to some extent, as over 1,400 retailers voluntarily collect
sales and use tax in SSUTA member states. See id. These retailers have remitted more
than $700 million in taxes to those states. Id. Even so, the SSUTA Governing Board
acknowledges that $700 million "is a very small fraction of the amount of sales tax that
remains uncollected." Id.
92. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992) (citations omitted).
93. The Quil/Court's decision that only the dormant Commerce Clause, and not the
Due Process Clause, supported the physical presence requirement means that Congress
can reverse the Quill decision by exercising its Commerce Clause power. If the Due
Process Clause constituted the basis of the physical presence requirement, Congress would
have no authority to eliminate the requirement. Given Congress' express constitutional
authority to regulate interstate commerce, however, the dormant Commerce Clause does
not prevent Congress from eliminating the physical presence requirement.
94. See, for example, the Main Street Fairness Act ("MSFA"), which would have
permitted SSUTA member states to require remote retailers to collect sales and use tax.
H.R. 5660, 111th Cong. § 4 (2010). A version of the MSFA was last introduced in 2007 as
the "Sales Tax Fairness and Simplification Act." See H.R. 3396, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007);
S.R. 34, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007). For a more comprehensive list of earlier versions of the
MSFA, see Quill, 504 U.S. at 318 n.11.
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3. North Carolina's "Amazon" Law
Seeing little effect on use tax compliance from the inclusion of
the reporting line on the state income tax return and frustrated by
congressional inaction in response to the SSUTA, North Carolina
tried another approach to shifting the use tax collection obligation to
the retailer-imputing physical presence nexus to out-of-state
retailers based on their marketing relationships with in-state
companies. In 2009, North Carolina became only the third state-
following New York and Rhode Island-to enact a so-called
"Amazon law."95 Under North Carolina's Amazon law, a remote
retailer is presumed to be doing business in the state, and is therefore
obligated to collect North Carolina sales and use taxes, if the retailer
has "an agreement with a resident of this State under which the
resident, for a commission or other consideration, directly or
indirectly refers potential customers, whether by a link on an Internet
website or otherwise, to the retailer."96 That is, the Amazon law
deems an out-of-state retailer to have an in-state physical presence if
the retailer has a "click-through agreement" with an in-state
company, i.e., pays commissions to an in-state company for every
customer that "clicks through" a link on the in-state company's
website and makes a purchase from the out-of-state retailer. In effect,
the Amazon law treats the in-state company linking customers to the
out-of-state retailer's website as an agent soliciting sales in the state
on behalf of the retailer. 97
According to North Carolina, the Supreme Court in Scripto, Inc.
v. Carson" established the basis for imputing a physical presence to
the otherwise out-of-state retailer as a result of these "click-through"
agreements with in-state companies. In Scrnpto, the taxpayer, a
company "in the business of selling mechanical writing instruments,"
employed ten independent contractors "conducting continuous local
solicitation in Florida" on behalf of the company.99 The independent
contractors solicited orders and sent them back to the company's
95. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.8(b)(3) (2009); see also N.Y. TAX LAW
§ I l01(b)(8)(vi) (McKinney 2010) (New York's Amazon Law); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-18-15
(2010) (Rhode Island's Amazon Law).
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.8(b)(3) (2009).
97. The imputed physical presence created by the Amazon law applies "only if the
cumulative gross receipts from sales by the retailer to purchasers in this State who are
referred to the retailer by all residents with this type of agreement with the retailer is in
excess of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) during the preceding four quarterly periods." Id.
98. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
99. Id. at 208, 211.
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office in Georgia, where they were accepted and fulfilled. 0 Other
than these independent contractors, Scripto had no presence in
Florida. It did not "own, lease, or maintain any office, distributing
house, warehouse or other place of business in Florida" or "have any
regular employee or agent there."10' Nevertheless, the Court found
that the presence of independent contractors in Florida soliciting on
behalf of Scripto amounted to a sufficient nexus with Florida to
permit the state to require Scripto to collect use tax.102 Based on the
holding in Scrpto, North Carolina contends that out-of-state retailers
that have click-through agreements with North Carolina companies
are obligated to collect use tax.'o
Not surprisingly, out-of-state retailers, such as Amazon, have
disagreed with this interpretation of Scripto. They contend that in-
state companies with links on their websites to the websites of out-of-
state retailers are just providing a modern form of "advertising,"
which does not amount to "solicitation" and therefore fails to
establish an in-state physical presence under Quill." On this basis,
Amazon has challenged New York's Amazon law,' which served as
the model for North Carolina's law.'0 6 To date, the New York trial
court and intermediate appellate court have upheld New York's
Amazon law against Amazon's constitutional challenge.'
100. Id. at 209.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 210-11 ("There must be ... some definite link, some minimum connection,
between a state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to tax. We believe that
such a nexus is present here.") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Felt & Tarrant
Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1939) (upholding California's use tax obligation
based on the presence of two "general agents" soliciting on behalf of the taxpayer in the
state).
103. SeeN.C. DEP'T OF REVENUE, FORM E-505 9-09, at 2-3, available athttp:lwww
.dornc.com/downloads/e505_8-09.pdf (noting that North Carolina's Amazon law "codifies
the principle announced by the United States Supreme Court in Scripto v. Carson that a
state may require tax collection by a remote retailer that had contacts with 10 independent
contractors in the state who solicited orders for products on its behalf").
104. The taxpayer in Quillwas held not to have a physical presence in North Dakota
even though it "solicitled] business through catalogs and flyers, advertisements in national
periodicals, and telephone calls." Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302 (1992).
Thus, the distinction between "solicitation" (creating nexus in Scripto) and
"advertisement" (not establishing nexus in Quill) is seen as potentially dispositive with
respect to the physical presence standard.
105. See Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 877 N.Y.S.2d 842,
846 (N.Y. Cnty. Sup. Ct. 2009), aFld, 913 N.Y.S.2d 129 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2010)
(upholding New York's Amazon law).
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.8(b)(3) (2009); see N.Y. TAX LAW § 1101(b)(8)(vi)
(McKinney 2010).
107. The Appellate Division rejected the facial challenges to New York's Amazon law.
It did, however, remand the case to the New York trial court to consider the as-applied
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Despite New York's early success in defending its Amazon law
and regardless of whether the law is ultimately upheld, North
Carolina's Amazon law likely will have little impact on increasing use
tax collections in North Carolina because Amazon and other out-of-
state retailers have taken steps to limit the effect of North Carolina's
law. Immediately after North Carolina enacted its Amazon law,
Amazon and other internet retailers discontinued their click-through
agreements with North Carolina companies, thereby avoiding any
possible imputation of physical presence nexus based on those
agreements."os As a result, in a striking example of unintended
consequences, North Carolina's attempt to increase its use tax
collections by enacting the Amazon law, in the end, may have cost the
state tax dollars. When Amazon terminated its click-through
agreements with in-state companies, it also eliminated the
commission income those in-state companies received under the
agreements, which would have been taxable in North Carolina.
Consequently, North Carolina not only failed to increase use tax
collections from remote retailers like Amazon but also lost the
income tax revenues the in-state companies otherwise would have
paid. 109
challenge by Amazon. Amazon.com LLC v. N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 913
N.Y.S.2d 129, 132 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dept. 2010). While the New York and North
Carolina Amazon laws are identical in statutory language, the New York Appellate
Division (the state's intermediate appellate court) relied heavily on administrative
issuances by the New York Department of Taxation and Finance in rejecting Amazon's
constitutional challenge to the Amazon law. Id. at 133. North Carolina does not presently
have comparable administrative guidance, which could make it easier for Amazon and
other remote retailers to successfully challenge North Carolina's Amazon law. For an
insightful analysis of the New York Appellate Division's decision, see Edward A.
Zelinsky, New York Appellate Division Upholds "Amazon" Law: Analysis, 59 ST. TAX
NOTES 93, 97-100 (2011).
108. See Mark Binker, Amazon Cuts Relationships with N.C. Affiliates, GREENSBORO
NEWS & REC., June 26, 2009, http://www.news-record.com/content/2009/06/26/article
/amazon cuts- relationships with affiliates. In contrast, Amazon did not sever ties with its
New York marketing associates after New York enacted its Amazon law. See Zelinsky,
supra note 107, at 102-03.
109. North Carolina is not the only state to suffer from unintended consequences
relating to efforts to collect additional sales and use taxes. In February 2011, Amazon
announced that it intended to close a distribution facility operated by an Amazon
subsidiary after the Texas Comptroller's Office assessed Amazon $269 million for failing
to collect sales tax on sales made to Texas residents between December 2005 and
December 2009. SeeNancy J. Moore, Amazon.com to Close TexasFacilityin Dispute Over
State's Tax Demand, DAILY TAX REPORT No. 30, Feb. 14, 2011, at H-2. The
Comptroller's Office apparently based the assessment on Amazon's alleged physical
presence in Texas through its subsidiary. Maria Halkias, Texas Bills Amazon for Millions
rn Sales Taxes, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 23, 2010, http://www.dallasnews.com
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4. The Internet Transactions Resolution Program
Given the limited effectiveness of its Amazon law and its prior
educational efforts, North Carolina was compelled to consider other
ways to capture sales and use taxes from remote retailers. In 2010, the
state created an amnesty program, the "Internet Transactions
Resolution Program" (the "ITR Program"), that it hoped would
induce out-of-state retailers (even those that discontinued their click-
through agreements with in-state companies following enactment of
the Amazon law) to collect use tax on a prospective basis."o
In effect, through the ITR Program, the DOR tried to leverage
the potential liability of remote retailers that did not collect sales and
use taxes during any periods they had click-through agreements with
North Carolina companies to force those retailers to begin collecting
use taxes prospectively. Under the ITR Program, the DOR agreed
not to assess any taxes, penalties, or interest for an out-of-state
retailer's failure to collect sales or use taxes for periods prior to
September, 2010, if the retailer agreed to collect sales and use taxes
for at least a four year period commencing on that date. "' How could
an out-of-state retailer that terminated its click-through agreements
upon enactment of the Amazon law have any liability for failing to
collect sales or use tax for periods before North Carolina enacted its
Amazon law? According to the DOR, the Amazon law simply
"clarified" existing law, and out-of-state retailers with click-through
agreements with North Carolina companies always had physical
presence nexus with the state based on those agreements-even
before the Amazon law went into effect.112 Moreover, because there is
/business/headlines/20101023-Texas-bills-Amazon-for-millions-in-363 1.ece. The closure of
the distribution center will result in Amazon laying off 119 employees. Moore, supra.
110. Andrew M. Ballard, North Carolina Launches Program Aimed at Collecting
Internet Sales Taxes, DAILY TAX REPORT No. 78, Apr. 26, 2010, at H-3.
111. See id. One other state, Oklahoma, has offered a similar amnesty program for out-
of-state retailers, even though it has not even passed an Amazon law like those in effect in
New York and North Carolina. Under Oklahoma's "Retailer Compliance Initiative," the
Oklahoma Tax Commission agrees not to "assess or seek payment of uncollected use
taxes" from out-of-state retailers for the period from July 1, 2009 through June 30, 2010, if
the retailers agree to register with the state and collect use taxes for at least a three year
period starting on July 1, 2011. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 710:1-11-1 to -5 (2010),
available athttp://www.tax.ok.gov/rules/ER- 11-29-10.pdf.
112. See Frequently Asked Questions about Internet Transactions Resolution Program,
N.C. DEP'T OF REVENUE, http://staging.www.dor.state.nc.us/faq/itrp.html#ammendment
(archival copy on file with authors) ("[U]nder [the Amazon law], a retailer with
representatives in the State who solicit or transact business on behalf of the retailer has
always been subject to sales tax. The amendment simply modernized the terminology of the
statute and added a bright line rebuttable presumption. The amendment did not change
the nexus standard. Retailers with affiliate programs in North Carolina therefore have
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no statute of limitations for sales and use tax liability if a retailer fails
to file a sales or use tax return, 13 out-of-state retailers could face
substantial liabilities for not collecting sales and use taxes in
transactions with North Carolina purchasers at any time (before or
after effectiveness of the Amazon law) that the retailers had click-
through agreements with in-state companies.
But the DOR may have over-reached in arguing that out-of-state
companies should be held liable for failing to collect use tax for
periods before North Carolina's Amazon law became effective. Prior
to enactment of the Amazon law, there was no realistic way for
remote retailers to know that they were obligated to collect use tax in
North Carolina based solely on their click-through agreements with
in-state companies. The Amazon law was an innovative and novel
application of principles derived from Scripto, in which the Court
attributed the out-of-state taxpayer with physical presence nexus
based on sales agents engaging in face-to-face solicitation in-state on
its behalf.114 The Amazon law attributes physical presence based on
the existence of an agreement to compensate in-state companies for
sending customers to out-of-state retailers via an internet link rather
than face-to-face solicitation. While arguably legitimate, the DOR's
interpretation is certainly an extension of Scripto. As such, the DOR's
threat to hold out-of-state companies liable for failing to predict this
extension and collect sales and use tax based on their click-through
agreements with in-state companies violates the core tax principle
that those potentially liable for a tax should have fair notice of their
obligations."'
Not surprisingly, then, although the DOR sent information about
the ITR program to 450 out-of-state retailers, only twenty-four signed
on to participate in the program by the August 21, 2010 deadline.116
Amazon was not one of them.
always had nexus with the State and a duty to collect and remit sales tax." (emphasis
added)).
113. SeeN.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-241.8(b)(2) (2009).
114. The Scripto Court did not actually use the term "physical presence," as it
preceded both Bellas Hess and Quill. Nevertheless, the taxpayer's contacts with Florida
through its sales agents constituted sufficient nexus for the Court to find it constitutional
for Florida to require the company to collect use tax on its behalf. See Scripto, Inc. v.
Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 211, 213 (1960).
115. RICHARD K. VEDDER & LOWELL E. GALLAWAY, JOINT ECON. COMM., SOME
UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF TAX POLICY 4 (1998), available athttp://www.house.gov/jec
/fiscal/tx-grwth/taxpol/taxpol.pdf ("A good tax is one that is transparent; people are aware
of its existence and know the burden that it imposes.").
116. See Emery P. Dalesio, NC Sees Few Takers to Online Sales Tax Amnesty Bid,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Aug. 26, 2010, http://www.newsrecord.com/content/2010/08
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II. BALANCING USE TAX COLLECTION AGAINST TAXPAYERS'
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO RECEIVE EXPRESSIVE MATERIALS
ANONYMOUSLY
North Carolina and Amazon have been arguing about use tax
collection since 2000, when North Carolina first contacted Amazon
about the retailers' alleged tax obligations.' While Amazon has
steadfastly denied having any responsibility for collecting use taxes,
North Carolina has continued to seek ways to capture these lost
revenues. As part of the state's ongoing efforts, in 2009 the DOR
contacted Amazon and directed it to remit all taxes that North
Carolina alleged were due on the roughly fifty million transactions
with North Carolina purchasers from August 2003 through February
2010."' When Amazon objected, the DOR attempted a new strategy
to recover its lost tax revenues-audit Amazon and use the
information obtained through the audit to pursue North Carolina
purchasers directly for their use tax liabilities. As explained by the
DOR:
This audit [of Amazon] involves not only the potential sales tax
liability of Amazon, but also the potential use tax liability of
Amazon's North Carolina customers.... Because Amazon has
failed to collect sales tax on its sales to North Carolina
customers, [the DOR] also requires the identity of those
customers and minimal product descriptions in order to
determine whether they have complied with the North Carolina
use tax laws.'19
Yet, despite the DOR's repeated claim that it sought only
"minimal product descriptions," in December 2009 the DOR sent an
information request to Amazon seeking "all information for all sales
to customers with a North Carolina shipping address by month in an
electronic format for all dates between August 1, 2003, and February
28, 2010."l120
/26/article/nc sees few takers to online sales tax amnestybid; Penelope Lemov, The
'Amazon Tax'Battle Escalates, GOVERNING.COM (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.governing
.com/topics/finance/amazon-sales-tax-battle-escalates.html#continued.
117. North Carolina Motion to Dismiss at 4, Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d
1154 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (No. 10-cv-00664-MJP), available athttp://docs.justia.com/cases
/federal/districtcourts/washington/wawdce/2:2010cv00664/167064/43/0.pdf.
118. Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1158 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
119. North Carolina Motion to Dismiss, supra note 117, at 5.
120. Complaint for Declaratory Relief at T 26, Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp.
2d 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-00664-BAT) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Although Amazon had repeatedly refused to collect use taxes on
the state's behalf, the company did respond to the DOR's audit
request, providing the DOR with extensive information regarding the
millions of purchases that North Carolinians made during the
specified time period.12 ' In particular, Amazon gave the DOR "the
order ID number, seller, ship-to city, county, postal code, the non-
taxable amount of the purchase, and the tax audit record
identification" as well as the "Amazon Specific Identification
Number" ("ASIN") for every purchase made by North Carolina
customers from 2003 through 2010.122 The ASIN enabled the DOR to
access detailed information about every product purchased, including
the specific titles of books and videos.123 Amazon, however, did not
provide the DOR with the "name, address, phone number, e-mail
address or other personally identifiable information of any
customer." 24
Dissatisfied with this response, North Carolina wrote Amazon in
March 2010 and reiterated its request for "all information for all sales
to customers with a North Carolina shipping address," including the
name and address of the payer and of the person to whom the
product was shipped.125 In addition, the DOR threatened that if
Amazon did not provide the requested information, the DOR would
file a summons against the company in North Carolina, subjecting
Amazon to potential contempt penalties if it did not produce the
requested information. 2 6 instead of waiting to be haled into court in
North Carolina, Amazon filed suit against the DOR on April 19,
2010, in federal court in the Western District of Washington. In the
suit, Amazon sought a declaration that the DOR's request for
Amazon to provide "all information" regarding customer




125. Id. According to the DOR, the names of specific purchasers were needed "to
determine if any exceptions to the sales or use tax apply." Id. at 1160. Yet, as the Court
noted, the DOR admitted that, absent such information, it would tax Amazon at the
highest rates and leave it to Amazon to prove that an exemption or lower tax rate applied.
Id. Thus, the requested information was not actually necessary for the purposes of
auditing Amazon's tax liability, as opposed to determining which North Carolinians owed
use taxes.
126. Id. at 1159; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-258 (2009) (authorizing the Secretary of
Revenue to examine any "books, papers, records, or other data" relevant to "ascertaining
the correctness of any return," as well as summoning individuals to produce and testify
about the relevant information). Section 105-258 is the state analogue to 26 U.S.C. § 7602
(2006).
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purchases-including the identities of consumers and the titles of the
expressive materials they purchased-violated (i) the First
Amendment speech rights of Amazon and its customers 2 7 as well as
(ii) the Video Privacy Protection Act.128 According to Amazon, if the
DOR received the requested information, it would "possess all
information necessary to know the expressive content of all purchases
from Amazon by individual North Carolina residents," which would
impermissibly chill the speech activity of Amazon's customers. 129
Seven individuals represented by the American Civil Liberties Union
moved to intervene in the action, raising similar claims under the First
Amendment and the Video Privacy Protection Act and explaining
that they would stop purchasing expressive material online if the
DOR was allowed to track their purchases.3 0
Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the court in
Amazon.com LLC v. Lay entered an order granting summary
judgment to Amazon on its First Amendment claim.'' The court held
that the DOR's request for "all information for all sales" by Amazon
to customers in North Carolina impermissibly chilled speech and
127. The Supreme Court has recognized that organizations can assert the First
Amendment rights of others. For example, in NAACP v. Alabama, the Court permitted
the NAACP to assert the First Amendment rights of its members because the identity of
the members, which was the subject of Alabama's information request and the basis of the
First Amendment challenge to that request, would be compromised if the members were
forced to appear and personally invoke their First Amendment rights. 357 U.S. 449, 459
(1958); see also Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988)
(holding that booksellers had standing to assert the First Amendment rights of book
buyers).
128. Amazon, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1160. The Video Privacy Protection Act (the
"VPPA"), Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2710
(2006)), was passed in 1988 in response to the press disclosing the video rental records of
United States Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork. See Video Privacy Protection Ac,
EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/vppa/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2011). The VPPA "makes it
illegal for a video tape service provider," like Amazon, "to disclose 'personally identifiable
information concerning any consumer.'" Amazon, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1166 (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2006)). The Washington federal district court found that the DOR's
information request violated the VPPA because it required Amazon to "disclose the
personally identifiable information about its customers to the government." Id. at 1167.
129. Amazon, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1159. After Amazon filed its complaint, the DOR
informed Amazon that it was "not seeking information regarding the titles of books and
CDs purchased by North Carolina customers" and that such specific information was not
necessary "to calculate the amount of sales or use tax properly due the State." Id (internal
quotation marks omitted). The DOR, however, refused to amend its initial broad request
and, in fact, continued to request the name and bill to and ship to addresses for all sales to
North Carolina customers so that it could "determine Amazon's and its customers' North
Carolina sales and use tax liability." Id. at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1169.
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therefore violated the First Amendment.132 The court, however, did
not grant Amazon the specific relief it requested; rather, the court
held that if the DOR destroyed the detailed purchase information it
previously received, it could issue a new information request for
"information as to only the names and addresses of Amazon's
customers and general product information.""' Accordingly, we
analyze both the court's conclusion that the DOR's initial broad
request violated the First Amendment and its implicit finding that its
proposed, more limited information request does not violate the First
Amendment.
A. Anonymity in Purchasing Expressive Materials: The First
Amendment Right ofAmazon's North Carolina Purchasers
The district court properly held that the DOR's request to
Amazon for "all information" relating to the purchases by North
Carolina customers violated the customers' First Amendment
rights.'34 Although the DOR's request neither prohibited nor
132. Id. at 1170.
133. Id. at 1171.
134. In its Complaint, Amazon also invoked its First Amendment rights: "Amazon
asserts the privacy and First Amendment rights of itself and of its customers ... [to be]
protected from unnecessary government scrutiny." See Complaint for Declaratory Relief,
supra note 120, at 7. Although the district court did not analyze whether Amazon's First
Amendment rights were implicated, Amazon's complaint raises an important and
previously unresolved question: whether the First Amendment imposes any limits on the
government's ability to compel disclosures pursuant to its taxing power. There is no doubt
that the government has broad authority to pursue its tax collection efforts. See generally
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 815-16 (1984) (holding that there is
no accountant-client privilege that protects a client's papers from being disclosed during
an IRS audit). But the government's authority to tax is not unlimited, and when its taxing
power implicates the First Amendment, strict scrutiny applies: "A tax that burdens rights
protected by the First Amendment cannot stand unless the burden is necessary to achieve
an overriding governmental interest." Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582 (1983). Thus, Amazon might argue that the DOR's
information request also implicates its First Amendment rights such that strict scrutiny
also should apply to the DOR's request. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S.
781, 798 (1988); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986). After
all, the First Amendment protects the right not to speak as well as the right to speak.
Riley, 487 U.S. at 796-97. And, as the Court has acknowledged, the right to be free from
compelled speech applies to companies, such as Amazon, as well as to individuals. Pac.
Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at 1; First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 776, 777 (1978).
Moreover, this right is not limited to compelled political or ideological statements because
even "compelled statements of 'fact' ... burden[] protected speech." See Riley, 487 U.S. at
797-98.
Although courts and taxpayers apparently assume that the government can
require taxpayers to disclose such information, the Court has not explained whether strict
scrutiny applies or whether tax information falls within an exception to the general rules
against compelled speech. If strict scrutiny applies, then the request might be
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compelled North Carolina consumers to speak, it threatened a
particular aspect of consumers' First Amendment rights-the right to
receive expressive materials anonymously. But while the district court
reached the proper conclusion with respect to the DOR's information
request, its reasoning failed to convey the novelty and complexity of
the First Amendment issues involved in the case. This failure is
evident from the fact that the district court did not even consider
whether its proposed alternative-allowing the DOR to destroy the
detailed product information and issue a new request for customer
identities matched with more generalized information about the
products purchased-violates the First Amendment. Accordingly, to
provide a more fully developed First Amendment analysis, we
consider two separate questions for each proposed request: (i)
whether the information request implicates the First Amendment
rights of Amazon's customers and, if so, (ii) whether the information
request violates those rights under the applicable standard of review.
1. The DOR's Initial Information Request Implicates the First
Amendment Rights of Amazon's North Carolina Purchasers
While the text of the First Amendment states only that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press,""' the Supreme Court has interpreted the protection
afforded under the First Amendment broadly. According to the
Court, freedom of speech and press include more than the freedom to
speak or to publish: "The right of freedom of speech and press
includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to
distribute, the right to receive, the right to read." 3 6 Just as the
unconstitutional because it does not seek "relevant information" regarding Amazon's tax
liability. North Carolina is seeking information from Amazon about third parties even
though, as the district court acknowledges, that information is not necessary for the DOR
to carry out its audit. Is all information relevant provided it has some connection to tax
collection or should the Court impose a higher standard to protect the First Amendment
rights of individuals and companies? If Amazon has a First Amendment right that shields
it from having to provide the identities of its customers when that information is not
necessary for (or possibly relevant to) the DOR's calculation of Amazon's tax liability,
then Amazon can refuse to provide customer names for all purchases whether or not those
purchases involve expressive materials. Thus, Amazon raises a unique First Amendment
issue regarding the scope of the First Amendment rights of consumers and companies that
are required to reveal tax information regarding third parties when that information may
not be directly relevant to the calculation of their own tax liability.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
136. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); see also Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64-65 n.6 (1963) ("The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the
press embraces the circulation of books as well as their publication."); Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 150 (1943) (noting that "the free publication and dissemination of books and
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freedom not to speak is a "complementary component" of the right to
speak,"' the "right [to receive information] is an inherent corollary of
the rights of free speech and press. . . . [T]he right to receive ideas is a
necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own
rights of speech, press, and political freedom."'
Of course, neither the DOR's request nor Amazon's responding
to that request directly prohibits consumers from receiving expressive
materials from Amazon or other internet retailers. If the DOR's
request sought to limit access to certain books or videos based on the
content of those materials, then the First Amendment would be
implicated directly.'1 9 For example, in Stanley v. Georgia,'40 the Court
noted that, while obscene materials are unprotected speech under the
First Amendment, the First Amendment prohibits a state's
criminalizing the mere possession of obscene materials in one's home:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our
whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men's minds.'4 '
According to the Court, the First Amendment secures both "the
right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social
worth" and the "right to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwarranted governmental intrusions into one's privacy."l4
The DOR, however, expressed no interest in regulating or
restricting the ability of retailers or consumers to buy or sell
expressive materials. Rather, according to the DOR, it wanted the
identities and product purchase information for North Carolina
other forms of the printed word furnish very familiar applications" of the First
Amendment); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) ("The right of freedom
of speech and press has broad scope.... This freedom embraces the right to distribute
literature . .. and necessarily protects the right to receive it." (citations omitted)).
137. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("The right to speak and the right to
refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of
'individual freedom of mind.'" (quoting W.Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943))).
138. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982).
139. Id. at 867 (holding that the First Amendment precluded the government's
removing books from the shelves of a school library based on the content of those books).
140. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
141. Id. at 565. In Stanley, the appellant alleged that the First Amendment provided
broad protection for expressive activity, including "the right to be free from state inquiry
into the contents of his library." Id.
142. Id. at 564.
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customers only to properly determine the amount of tax that Amazon
and those purchasers owed:
NC Revenue does in fact need information about Amazon's
customers in order to properly assess Amazon for sales tax
liability.... More fundamentally, however, this information is
absolutely critical to NC Revenue's ability to assess Amazon's
customers for use tax liability.... Because Amazon has refused
to collect sales taxes on the sales of products it shipped to North
Carolina, its customers are liable for the use tax under North
Carolina law. Amazon's refusal to provide customer
information therefore directly impedes NC Revenue's ability to
assess taxes properly due the State.'43
Even assuming the sincerity of the DOR's claims, though, the
district court held that the government's alleged good faith-i.e., that
it would use the requested information only for its limited tax
purposes and not to deter expressive activity-was insufficient:
"While the DOR states that it could not possibly match the names to
the purchases, its promise of forbearance is insufficient to moot the
First Amendment issue."'"
Moreover, given the broad protection afforded speech under the
First Amendment, 45 the fact that the government is not directly
prohibiting the sale or receipt of expressive materials does not end
the inquiry. Because the First Amendment also protects freedom
from "unwanted governmental intrusion into one's privacy,"' 46 First
Amendment values are also violated when the government acts in a
way that deters or chills First Amendment activity, such as the
purchase of expressive materials. As Justice Douglas stated in his oft-
quoted concurrence in United States v. Rumely47:
A requirement that a publisher disclose the identity of those
who buy his books, pamphlets, or papers is indeed the
beginning of surveillance of the press. True, no legal sanction is
involved here. Congress has imposed no tax, established no
board of censors, instituted no licensing system. But the
143. North Carolina Motion to Dismiss, supra note 117, at 11-12.
144. Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1169 (W.D. Wash. 2010); see also
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010) (stating that the Court "would not
uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the Government promised to use it
responsibly").
145. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 891 (2010)
("First Amendment standards, however, 'must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting
rather than stifling speech.' " (citation omitted)).
146. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
147. 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
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potential restraint is equally severe.... Once the government
can demand of a publisher the names of the purchasers of his
publications, the free press as we know it disappears. Then the
spectre of a government agent will look over the shoulder of
everyone who reads. The purchase of a book or pamphlet today
may result in a subpoena tomorrow. Fear of criticism goes with
every person into the bookstall.... When the light of publicity
may reach any student, any teacher, inquiry will be
discouraged.... If [a remote retailer] can be required to
disclose what [purchasers] read yesterday and what [they] will
read tomorrow, fear will take the place of freedom in the
libraries, bookstores, and homes of the land.. . . Congress could
not do this by law. The power of investigation is also limited.
Inquiry into personal and private affairs is precluded.'4 8
In Rumely, the Court considered whether the House Select
Committee on Lobbying Activities could compel an organization to
disclose the names of people who purchased books "of a particular
political tendentiousness."' 49 The majority in Rumely did not reach
the underlying First Amendment issue, dismissing the case because
Congress had not given the legislative committee the power to
investigate attempts to influence public opinion.' But the Court
subsequently has applied Justice Douglas's First Amendment analysis
to protect the constitutional right to anonymity when individuals are
engaged in expressive activity.
For example, in NAACP v. Alabama,"' the State of Alabama
sought the names and addresses of all NAACP members in Alabama.
In holding that the constitution provided "immunity from state
scrutiny of . .. membership lists," the Court cited to Justice Douglas's
concurrence in Rumely for the proposition that "[i]nviolability of
privacy in group association may in many circumstances be
indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly
where a group espouses dissident beliefs."' 52 Moreover, in Lamont v.
Postmaster General of the United States,'53 the Court directly
considered a postal regulation that prohibited an addressee from
receiving "communist political propaganda" unless he previously filed
a written request with the post office.'54 In striking down the
148. Id. at 57-58 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 42 (majority opinion).
150. Id. at 44, 48.
151. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
152. Id. at 450, 462.
153. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
154. Id. at 302.
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regulation, the Court emphasized the deterrent effect of the
regulation and noted that such an identification requirement was "at
war with the 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate and
discussion that are contemplated by the First Amendment."
Similarly, in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC ("Denver Area"),"' the Court invalidated
part of a federal statute that required cable television subscribers to
submit a request to view "patently offensive" sexually themed
material on leased channels."' Pursuant to the statute, cable
operators were required to block access to such material and could
provide unblocked access only after receiving a written request from
a cable subscriber. Focusing once again on the deterrent effect of the
restriction, the Court struck down the requirement because it would
"further restrict viewing by subscribers who fear for their reputations
should the operator, advertently or inadvertently, disclose the list of
those who wish to watch the 'patently offensive' channel.""
Although the district court in Amazon did not expressly rely on
NAACP v. Alabama, Stanley, Lamont, or Denver Area,'59 it
acknowledged that the First Amendment "protects a buyer from
having the expressive content of her purchase of books, music, and
audiovisual materials disclose*d to the government."'6 0 According to
the court, anonymity is important because it " 'exemplifies the
purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in
particular.' "161 Absent the freedom to receive expressive materials
anonymously, the government would be able to monitor the reading
and viewing habits of its citizens, which, as Justice Douglas
emphasized in his Rumely concurrence, would limit the free exercise
155. Id. at 307 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
156. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
157. Id. at 733-34.
158. Id. at 754.
159. Moreover, the Court has sought to protect anonymity in the context of campaign
speech as well. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court recognized that the "invasion of privacy of
belief may be as great when the information sought concerns the giving and spending of
money as when it concerns the joining of organizations, for '[flinancial transactions can
reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs.' " 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring) (quoting California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-79
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring)). Consistent with these First Amendment cases, the district
court properly held that "the First Amendment protects the disclosure of individual's
reading, listening, and viewing habits." Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154,
1168 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
160. Amazon, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
161. Id. (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)); see
also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (extending anonymity under the First
Amendment to the distribution of campaign literature).
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of one's First Amendment rights: " 'Some will fear to read what is
unpopular what the powers-that-be dislike. When the light of
publicity may reach any student, any teacher, inquiry will be
discouraged.' "162 The Amazon court's opinion also reflects Lamonts
concern about the deterrent effect of the government seeking to
know who is reading certain types of expressive materials: "The fear
of government tracking and censoring one's reading, listening, and
viewing choices chills the exercise of First Amendment rights."'
Accordingly, the district court properly held that the DOR's request
for "all information for all sales to customers with a North Carolina
shipping address," implicated the First Amendment rights of
Amazon's customers because the request would chill the exercise of
the constitutionally-protected right to receive information."
2. The DOR's Information Request Fails Heightened Scrutiny and,
Therefore, Violates the First Amendment Rights of North
Carolinians to Receive Expressive Materials from Remote Retailers
Anonymously
Having determined that the First Amendment applied to the
DOR's information request, the district court next addressed whether
that request actually violated the First Amendment. Although the
Supreme Court has recognized the importance of anonymity under
the First Amendment, it has not determined the standard of review
that applies to information requests that (i) implicate the First
Amendment and (ii) arise within the context of the state's exercising
its tax collecting authority. As a result, the Washington district court
looked to two of the three lower federal court decisions that have
addressed the standard for reviewing governmental requests for
information that threaten constitutionally-protected anonymity.' In
both cases, the government issued subpoenas seeking the identities of
individuals who purchased expressive materials, and the lower federal
courts had to determine whether heightened scrutiny applied.166
162. Amazon, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (quoting United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41,
57-58 (1953) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
163. Id.
164. Id. In reaching its conclusion that the First Amendment applies, the district court
also relied on the "uncontroverted statements" of the intervenors that "they fear the
disclosure of their identities and purchases from Amazon to the DOR and that they will
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In In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com Dated August 7,
2006 (" WI Grand JurFY'),'67 the government was investigating an
independent book seller suspected of tax evasion. The book seller
used Amazon as a platform for making sales.'6' Accordingly, as part
of its investigation, the government issued a subpoena duces tecum to
Amazon requesting the identities of the book seller's customers. 169
Although Amazon provided a variety of responsive information, it
refused to disclose the identities of its customers, invoking their First
Amendment right to privacy in their reading choices.' In upholding
the book purchasers' right to anonymity, the court applied a
heightened standard of review to the grand jury subpoena, requiring
the government "to pass a test of substantial relation or compelling
need."'
Applying this standard, the court found that, even though the
government had "a bona fide investigative need" to interview at least
some of the book buyers, "the government is not entitled to
unfettered access to the identities of even a small sample of this group
of book buyers without each book buyer's permission."' 72 The court
denied the government access to the requested information because
of its concern over the potentially chilling effect that revealing the
identities of book purchasers would have on the exercise of First
Amendment rights: "[I]f word were to spread over the Net-and it
would-that the FBI and the IRS had demanded and received
Amazon's list of customers and their personal purchases, the chilling
effect on expressive e-commerce would frost keyboards across
America."' 73 As a result, the court held that the First Amendment
prohibited the government from " 'peek[ing] into the reading habits
167. 246 F.R.D. 570 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
168. Id. at 571.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 572.
171. Id. at 573.
172. Id. Ultimately, the court attempted to reach a "compromise" solution by allowing
Amazon and the U.S. Attorney's Office to send letters to a small sample of book buyers
explaining to them the government's need for information about the book seller and
requesting for volunteers to provide information. Id. at 573, 576. The court specified,
however, that the letters would have to explain that "[a]nyone who wishes not to
participate in this exercise [i.e., the investigation], by virtue of his or her silence, will be
left alone, and the government will never learn that person's identity or the titles of
materials he/she purchased from [the book seller under investigation] through Amazon."
Id. at 574.
173. Id. at 573.
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of specific individuals without their prior knowledge or
permission.' "174
Several years earlier, the District Court for the District of
Columbia reached the same conclusion regarding the government's
authority to obtain the book purchase records of specific individuals.
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords, Inc.,"7
the court held that the First Amendment prevented the Independent
Counsel investigating President Clinton from obtaining the titles of
books that Monica Lewinsky purchased from a bookstore.7 Drawing
on Justice Douglas's opinion in Rumely, the court held that the
bookstore and Ms. Lewinsky "persuasively alleged a chilling effect on
their First Amendment rights." 7 Given that the First Amendment
was implicated, the court required the Independent Counsel to
demonstrate that the government had a compelling interest in
knowing the specific titles of her purchases and that there was a
sufficient nexus between that interest and the ongoing
investigation.' Because the governing standard had not been
clarified previously, the court ordered that the Independent Counsel
have an opportunity to make the requisite showing.17 9 But the court
affirmed the general principle upon which the Washington district
court in Amazon ultimately relied-that, when the First Amendment
rights of consumers are implicated, the government must not simply
have a compelling need for information related to its investigation; it
must show a compelling need for the specific titles that a particular
person purchased.'s
The District Court for the District of Columbia also applied a
heightened standard when governmental investigations touch on First
174. Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1168 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (quoting
In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com, 246 F.R.D. at 572).
175. 26 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1599 (D.D.C. 1998).
176. Id. at 1600-01.
177. Id. at 1600.
178. Id. at 1601; see also Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1083 (9th Cir. 1972)
(setting forth the standard for a grand jury subpoena that triggers the First Amendment:
"When governmental activity collides with First Amendment rights, the Government has
the burden of establishing that its interests are legitimate and compelling and that the
incidental infringement upon First Amendment rights is no greater than is essential to
vindicate its subordinate interests.").
179. Kramerbooks, 26 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1601.
180. Id.; see also Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1058 (Colo.
2002) (en banc) ("[T]he law enforcement officials' need to investigate crime will almost
invariably be a compelling one. Thus, the court must engage in a more specific inquiry as
to whether law enforcement officials have a compelling need for the precise and specific
information sought. Yet this more particularized showing captures the nexus requirement,
normally considered separately from the government's interest.").
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Amendment rights in In re Grand Jury Investigation of Possible
Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461,"8 which the Washington district court
did not cite. In that case, the government sought the names of
customers who purchased videos from a company that was being
investigated for distributing obscene materials. The federal district
court for the District of Columbia followed Kramerbooks and In re
Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com in holding that the First
Amendment protects the anonymity of customers.'8 2 Because the
government's request would have a chilling effect on First
Amendment activity, the government had to satisfy a heightened
standard of scrutiny to obtain the requested information. In
particular, the government had to show a compelling need for the
records sought "and a sufficient nexus between the records and the
grand jury's investigation."' The district court held that the
government had failed to meet this standard because, given the other
information that the government already had obtained, it lacked a
compelling need for the disclosure of the customers' nameS.184
181. 706 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 2009).
182. Id. ("[T]he expressive materials being investigated are presumptively protected by
the First Amendment and Company X's customers have a correlative right to receive that
information anonymously.").
183. Id. at 18.
184. Id. at 21; see Lubin v. Agora, Inc., 882 A.2d 833, 847 (Md. 2005). In Lubin, the
Maryland court held that the First Amendment precluded the Maryland Securities
Commissioner from enforcing a subpoena on a publisher that required the publisher to
disclose its subscriber list for certain investment newsletters and the names of those who
purchased a certain investment report. Consistent with the federal district court in
Kramerbooks, the Maryland Supreme Court held that the subpoenas implicated the First
Amendment:
Enforcement of the subpoenas would intrude upon the First Amendment rights of
Agora's subscribers and customers because disclosure of their subscriber status
and purchase of the Report would destroy the anonymity that the Supreme Court
has recognized as important to the unfettered exercise of First Amendment
freedoms . .. . Agora's subscribers may be discouraged from reading its materials
if they are interviewed by government personnel investigating potential securities
violations, even if the readers are told that, individually, they are not under
investigation.
Id. at 846. Based on the application of the First Amendment, the court in Lubin applied a
heightened "substantial relation" and "compelling interest" standard to the
Commissioner's subpoena. Id. at 849. The Commissioner failed to meet this standard. Id
Although the requested information "might be useful to the ... [Commissioner's]
investigation," the First Amendment precluded the Commissioner from engaging in a
" 'fishing expedition,' " i.e., from seeking the identities of individual subscribers and then
contacting those individuals in the hope of uncovering additional instances of securities
fraud. Id. at 847. Because the government lacked any compelling need for this additional
information and the effect would be to deter people from buying Agora's products,
"[e]nforcement of this demand would 'sacrifice First Amendment protections' for too
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The district court in Amazon, focusing on the chilling effect
caused by the government's monitoring the reading materials of its
citizens, also held that the DOR had to satisfy a heightened standard
of review before it could obtain the identities and specific titles of
expressive materials that Amazon's North Carolina customers
bought.' In particular, the DOR had to demonstrate "a compelling
governmental interest warrants the burden, and that less restrictive
means to achieve the government's ends are not available." 8 6
Drawing on Kramerbooks and In re Grand Jury Subpoena to
Amazon.com, the court also required the DOR to show "a
'substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of
overriding and compelling state interest' " in receiving the specific
information requested.187  The requirement that the government
establish a "substantial relation" between the State's interest and the
specific information requested served to protect First Amendment
rights even when the government was fulfilling one of its central
functions-tax collection. As United States v. Arthur Young & Co."'
demonstrates, the government always has a compelling interest in
collecting taxes and, therefore, gathering information pertinent to
that end:
Our complex and comprehensive system of federal taxation,
relying as it does upon self-assessment and reporting, demands
that all taxpayers be forthright in the disclosure of relevant
information to the taxing authorities. Without such disclosure,
and the concomitant power of the Government to compel
disclosure, our national tax burden would not be fairly and
equitably distributed. In order to encourage effective tax
'speculative a gain.'" Id. (quoting CBS v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127
(1973)).
185. Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1169 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (quoting
United States v. C.E. Hobbs Found., 7 F.3d 169, 173 (9th Cir. 1993)).
186. Id. (quoting C.E. Hobbs Found., 7 F.3d at 173); see also Beverly v. United States,
468 F.2d 732, 748 (5th Cir. 1972) ("It is simply a statement of long recognized horn-book
principles of constitutional law to say that no government, either state or federal, may
encroach upon First Amendment rights without the demonstration of a compelling
interest.").
187. Amazon, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (quoting Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation
Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963)); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65 (1976) ("This
type of scrutiny is necessary even if any deterrent effect on the exercise of First
Amendment rights arises, not through direct government action, but indirectly as an
unintended but inevitable result of the government's conduct in requiring disclosure."); St.
German ofAlaska E. Orthodox Catholic Church v. United States, 840 F.2d 1087, 1094 (2d
Cir. 1988) (stating that disclosure of information pursuant to an IRS summons "should not
be ordered unless it is substantially related to a compelling governmental interest").
188. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
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investigations, Congress has endowed the IRS with expansive
information-gathering authority . . . ."9
When the government's interest in tax collection threatens First
Amendment principles, though, the courts impose the additional
requirement that the government demonstrate a substantial
connection between that compelling interest and the particular
information sought-here, the identities of North Carolina residents
matched with the titles of their expressive purchases-to ensure that
the First Amendment rights of individuals are adequately
protected. 90 That is, as the district court noted, "[t]he DOR must
'actually need[] the disputed information.' "9'
Under the court's substantial relation test, though, the resolution
of Amazon's First Amendment defense to the DOR's broad request
for "all information" about North Carolina purchasers appears
relatively straightforward. Because "the DOR's requests for
information were made solely in the context of calculating Amazon's
potential tax liability," the DOR had to show a substantial relation
between the information sought ("all information" about purchases
by North Carolina customers) and the state's interest (calculating
Amazon's tax liability). 92 But given that "Amazon has provided all of
the data necessary to determine its tax liability, except any potential
tax exemptions," the DOR could not make the requisite showing.'93
Having received all the information it needed to calculate Amazon's
taxes, the DOR had no need for additional information regarding the
identities of the individuals who made specific purchases.'94
Although the DOR might want that information to determine
whether Amazon qualified for any tax exemptions, the DOR lacked a
compelling need to calculate those exemptions. The DOR simply
could assess Amazon for the maximum amount of taxes it contended
Amazon owed, and then Amazon could present evidence regarding
189. Id. at 815-16; see also In reGrand Jury Proceeding, 842 F.2d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir.
1988) (finding that a criminal investigation into tax evasion constitutes a compelling need
because "[n]o power is more basic to the ultimate purpose and function of government
than is the power to tax" (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); St. German, 840 F.2d at 1094 ("[A] compelling
governmental interest exists here-that of enforcement of the tax laws.").
190. The fact that the DOR has a compelling interest in tax enforcement helps explain
why the district court adopted the standard used in subpoena cases.
191. Amazon, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena to
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whether any of its sales were in fact tax exempt.' To the extent that
the DOR sought the identities of North Carolinians and the titles of
their specific purchases to gather general incriminating evidence
about their use tax obligations, such information was not substantially
related to "calculating Amazon's potential tax liability.""' Thus, the
DOR had no compelling interest in or need for "all information"
about North Carolina taxpayers, and its request failed heightened
scrutiny review.
B. The District Court's Modified Relief Allowing the DOR to
Obtain the Identities ofNorth Carolina Consumers and General
Information About Thek Purchases, May Also Threaten First
Amendment Principles
Although the district court held that the DOR's initial
information request violated the First Amendment, it did not grant
Amazon's requested relief to protect the anonymity of North
Carolina purchasers completely. Rather, the court stated that the
DOR's "demand[] that Amazon disclose its customers' names,
addresses or any other personal information ... violates the First
Amendment . .. only as long as the DOR continues to have access to
or possession of detailed purchase records obtained from Amazon
(including ASIN numbers)."' 97 Therefore, while the DOR could not
obtain customer identities while it continued to possess the detailed
purchase information that Amazon previously provided, the court
allowed the DOR to "issu[e] a new request for information as to only
the names and addresses of Amazon's customers and general product
information, assuming that DOR destroys any detailed information
that it currently possesses."'9 8
The court's ultimate holding, then, provides the DOR with a way
to obtain the names and addresses of North Carolina purchasers as
well as generic information about purchases of expressive materials,
e.g., that they bought a book or video.' Under the district court's
195. Id. ("[The DOR] admitted that it can and will assess Amazon at the highest rate
and it would permit Amazon to challenge the assessment and ... establish that exemptions
or lower tax rates applied to some products." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1171.
198. Id.
199. The court mentions in its Order that starting in 2008 Amazon maintained records
with generalized categories of goods sold to customers, e.g., "general books," "digital
books," "candy," and "general food." Id. at 1159. Therefore, it would not seem to be an
undue administrative burden for Amazon to provide this more generic information to the
DOR, at least for periods after 2008.
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opinion, neither Amazon's initial disclosure (giving detailed product
information but not the identities of purchasers) nor the court's
alternative approach (allowing the DOR to receive the identities of
purchasers and generic product information) violates the First
Amendment rights of consumers.200 That is, the First Amendment
protects anonymity, but its protection extends only to the DOR's
possessing "both sets of information," i.e., both the identity of each
North Carolina purchaser and the detailed product information. If the
DOR returned or destroyed the detailed information about each
purchase (such that the DOR could not determine the specific titles
of books or videos that a specific person bought), the DOR could
issue a new request seeking the identity of each purchaser matched
with a generic description of the products purchased.
Having spent much of its opinion evaluating whether the First
Amendment applied to the DOR's request and what the appropriate
standard was, though, the district court simply proposed the modified
relief without analyzing whether this new request violates the First
Amendment. That is, the court failed to explain why the DOR would
have a compelling need for customers' identities and more
generalized information about their purchases with respect to
determining Amazon's potential tax liability when the court already
found that "Amazon ha[d] provided all of the data necessary to
determine its tax liability, except any potential tax exemptions."20 1
Instead, the court appears to assume that the First Amendment is not
implicated by its proposed information request.
But the district court's order raises a novel and important First
Amendment question: whether the First Amendment prohibits the
disclosure of the names of individual consumers when the
government seeks "generic" information about the expressive
materials that the individual purchased. Accordingly, this Article does
what the Amazon court did not-subject the court's proposed
information request to the same First Amendment analysis as the
DOR's initial request. In other words, it considers whether the
proposed government request to Amazon for customer identities and
"generic" purchase information (i) implicates the First Amendment
rights of Amazon's customers and, if so, (ii) whether it violates those
rights under the applicable standard of review.
200. Id. at 1171.
201. Id
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1. Does the Amazon Court's Codified Information Request
Implicate the First Amendment?
As previously explained, government action implicates the First
Amendment not only when it prohibits speech but also when it chills
the right to receive information.2 02 Whether the Amazon court's
proposed information request implicates the First Amendment rights
of Amazon customers, then, depends on the chilling effect that the
DOR's knowing a specific individual purchased a particular type of
expressive material (such as "books" and "DVDs") would have on
the individual's willingness to make those purchases. In the most
basic terms, whether the court's proposed information request
triggers First Amendment protection turns on whether purchasers
would hesitate to buy from Amazon if they knew that the company
would be required to disclose to the government their identities and
the fact that they bought, for example, $100 worth of "books."
Given that it did not even consider the First Amendment
implications of its modified relief, the district court apparently
assumed that this type of disclosure would not deter purchasers'
willingness to buy books, videos, or other forms of expressive
materials from Amazon. If the request did chill speech, then, as the
court notes in its discussion of the DOR's initial information request,
heightened scrutiny would apply.20 3 The DOR would have to show a
substantial relation between its compelling interest and the specific
information sought. But the district court does not mention, let alone
apply, strict scrutiny (or any other standard) after modifying the
requested injunctive relief; it simply states that the DOR can request
the names and addresses of the individuals who purchased expressive
materials as well as generic product information about those
materials.204
Although the court fails to explain why the First Amendment
does not apply to this modified request, one can imagine the court's
reasoning as follows. Amazon, a general retailer, sells an expansive
variety of expressive materials on most every subject. Thus, under the
court's proposed information request, the government would know
only that a particular person bought a "book" or "video;" it would
not know the specific titles-or even the general subject matter (e.g.,
religion, politics, physical or psychological health, gender or sexual
topics)-of the expressive materials purchased. Given the lack of
202. See supra Part II.A.1.
203. Amazon, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
204. Id. at 1172.
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specific information about the individual's reading or viewing habits,
the government could not determine a specific individual's particular
reading habits, and therefore, speech activity would not be chilled.
Anonymity, the "shield from the tyranny of the majority," 205 is
preserved-at least at the level of what information an individual
receives, though, admittedly not as to the fact that the individual
received any expressive materials at all. But given that the
government would not know what consumers were reading or
viewing (only that they were purchasing things that could be read or
viewed), there would be no corresponding "chill" on speech. And
with no chilling effect on speech, the First Amendment simply is not
implicated.
This reasoning, though, seems at odds with one of the cases upon
which the Amazon court relies. In WI Grand Jury,206 the Wisconsin
district court suggests that the government's asking for the identities
of consumers and generic product information triggers First
Amendment protection when the product is an "expressive
medium."2 07 In that case, the government sought the identities of
book buyers who were "potential witnesses to ... alleged fraud and
tax evasion schemes [of a book seller under investigation] by virtue of
having completed financial transactions with him." 208 According to
the Wisconsin court, "neither the government nor the grand jury
[was] directly interested in the actual titles or content of the books
that people bought." 2 09 That is, the government was interested in the
identities of consumers only because they had bought "books" from
the book-seller. Nevertheless, the WI Grand Jury court expressed
concern over the potential chilling effect that disclosure of the book
buyers' identities might have and, therefore, prohibited the
government from obtaining "unfettered access to the identities of
even a small sample of . . . book buyers without each book buyer's
permission." 2 lo Explaining its reason for apprehension, the WI Grand
Jurycourt stated:
In this era of public apprehension about the scope of the
USAPATRIOT Act, the FBI's (now-retired) "Carnivore"
205. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding that an
Ohio prohibition against distributing anonymous campaign literature violated the First
Amendment).
206. 246 F.R.D. 570 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
207. Id. at 572.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 573.
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Internet search program, and more recent highly-publicized
admissions about political litmus tests at the Department of
Justice, rational book buyers would have a non-speculative
basis to fear that federal prosecutors and law enforcement
agents have a secondary political agenda that could come into
play when an opportunity presented itself. Undoubtedly a
measurable percentage of people who draw such conclusions
would abandon online book purchases in order to avoid the
possibility of ending up on some sort of perceived "enemies
list." 211
Given that the government is requesting the identity of
purchasers of expressive materials, even if it did not seek the titles or
specific information relating to those expressive materials, deterred
First Amendment activity, the court held that heightened scrutiny
should apply.2 12 But the WI Grand Jurycourt did not articulate a clear
standard for determining when government action has a chilling
effect on First Amendment activities. The court mentioned a
"rational book buyer[]" and speculated that a "measurable
percentage" of such rational book buyers would stop online
purchases if they believed the government would discover their
reading habits. 213 These references suggest a "reasonable person"
standard for deciding whether government's information seeking
chills the First Amendment activity of online book buyers. Yet at the
same time, the WI Grand Jury court expressly stated that it "should
concern itself with blogger outrage disproportionate to the
government's actual demand of Amazon" because "well-founded or
not, rumors of an Orwellian federal criminal investigation into the
reading habits of Amazon's customers could frighten countless
potential customers into canceling planned online book purchases,
now and perhaps forever." 2 14 That is, despite its previous mention of a
"rational book buyer," the court seems to apply a "subjective
concern" standard in assessing whether government inquiries
impermissibly deter speech activity. And, of course, the more
subjective the standard is for determining whether government action
chills First Amendment activity, the broader the protection is for
anonymity-and, consequently, the more difficult it is for the DOR to
obtain information regarding individual consumers' use tax liability.
211. Id. In this way, the court's reasoning is similar to Justice Douglas's position in
Rumely. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
212. WI Grand Jury, 246 F.R.D. at 573.
213. Id.
214. Id. (emphasis added).
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Moreover, even though the court acknowledged that the
government had no interest in the titles of any books that the
potential witnesses had purchased, the court noted that "it is an
unsettling and un-American scenario to envision federal agents
nosing through the reading lists of law-abiding citizens while hunting
for evidence against somebody else."215 Under this view of the First
Amendment, then, the Amazon court's modified relief-allowing the
DOR to obtain the identities of North Carolina purchasers and
generic product information about each purchase-threatens
anonymity in its own way. Although the DOR would not be able to
connect a specific title to a specific purchaser, it would know, at a
minimum, how many books, movies, magazines, or other expressive
materials each North Carolinian bought, the name of the remote
retailer or publisher who sold the materials, and the cost of each
purchase. If, as the WI Grand Jury court suggests, citizens' subjective
concern (whether "well-founded or not") over the threat of
government intrusion into their reading habits is sufficient to
implicate First Amendment protection, then the Amazon court's
proposed information request could be found to chill the receipt of
expressive materials, thereby infringing on the First Amendment
rights of Amazon's North Carolina customers.
Furthermore, under this "subjective concern" standard, the
uncontroverted testimony of the intervenors in the Amazon case
might be used to support the Wisconsin district court's view that the
disclosure of even generic product information with respect to
expressive materials may chill the reading and viewing habits of
consumers. In her complaint in the Amazon case, intervenor Jane
Doe 1 stated that her former spouse developed substance abuse and
domestic violence problems and that she purchased self-help books
from Amazon to help her understand the problems and to pursue a
divorce.2 16 As set out in her complaint, Jane Doe 1 wanted her
purchases to remain anonymous.2 17 And, given her situation, she
would want that anonymity to extend to the fact that she was
purchasing expressive materials at all.218 That is, she would not want
her abusive spouse to know that she secretly was purchasing any
215. Id. In WI Grand Jury, the government had not asked for any reading lists; it had
requested only witness identities, so there was no possibility of government agents "nosing
through" reading lists. Id.
216. Complaint in Intervention for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 16,
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books, even if he did not know the specific titles of those books. Yet
the forced disclosure of her purchases by Amazon to the DOR, and a
subsequent audit of Jane Doe 1 and her husband based on that
disclosure, could lead to his discovering those purchases. 2 19 As a
result, consumers like Jane Doe I might elect to stop purchasing
expressive materials online so as to avoid the possible disclosure of
their book purchases to the government (and perhaps others).
Similarly, other consumers might worry about the government's
learning that they purchased expressive materials (such as books or
videos), regardless of whether this information is ever disclosed to a
third party and, under the WI Grand Jury subjective concern
standard, whether their worries are well-founded. The fact that the
government knows that they are purchasing expressive materials
might be enough for some consumers to alter their purchasing habits
even if the government has no intention of using that information for
a nefarious purpose. 2 20
Thus, whether the Amazon court's modified information request
implicates the First Amendment depends on the standard used to
determine whether government actions chill First Amendment
activity. If a "reasonable person" standard is used, as courts have
done in the campaign speech context,22 1 then the court would have to
make a threshold determination as to whether a hypothetical
reasonable person would be deterred by the government's request.
Under such a standard, the testimony of one person (or a few people)
219. Moreover, each of the intervenors in the North Carolina Amazon case stated that
they intended to continue buying expressive materials through the internet but that their
"behavior will be changed as each time [they] purchase[] certain items in the future, [they]
will seriously have to consider whether to purchase them on a website if the State is able
to obtain that information." Id. at 20. Other intervenors expressed similar intentions. Id. at
18, 21-25. If some North Carolinians will be deterred from engaging in First Amendment
activity because the government is inquiring into their purchasing habits, the chilling
effect-and, therefore, the burden on the First Amendment-might be the same even if
the government does not know the specific title of the book or video.
220. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010) (holding that the Court
"would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the Government promised
to use it responsibly").
221. In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 842 F.2d 1229, 1235-36 (1lth Cir. 1988) (holding in
the context of campaign speech "that a merely subjective fear of future reprisal is
insufficient to establish a restraint on freedom of association. The Supreme Court
recognized the difficulties of formally proving the evils of chill and harassment, however,
and accordingly required only that minor parties show 'a reasonable probability that the
compelled disclosure . . . will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either
Government officials or private parties.'" (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74
(1976))); see also Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm'n, 459 U.S. 87, 101-02
(1982) (invalidating a campaign disclosure provision as applied to the Socialist Workers
Party).
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would not be sufficient by itself to establish a chilling effect. Rather,
the court would have to make its own assessment, determining
whether the disclosure of the identities of online purchasers and
generic information about their purchases would chill the First
Amendment activity of a reasonable person. Under this standard, a
court may find that the Amazon court's modified request does not
implicate the First Amendment because the government obtains no
information about the political, religious, or other personal
preferences, beliefs, or views of the consumer; rather, the government
learns only that a consumer purchased a certain amount of expressive
materials.
On the other hand, if a "subjective concern" standard is used, the
court could determine, based on affidavits or the court's own analysis,
that the government's seeking of information about the amount of
expressive materials purchased by specific individuals would deter
some consumers from purchasing expressive materials online-
whether the basis for their decision to stop buying expressive
materials is well-founded or not. Under this analysis, the chilling
effect caused by the government's attempt to obtain even generic
purchase information, as authorized by the Amazon court's modified
information request, might "frost keyboards across America" and,
therefore, implicate the First Amendment rights of Amazon's North
Carolina customers.2 22
2. Does the Amazon Court's Modified Information Request Violate
the First Amendment?
If the modified information request for generic purchase
information does not implicate the First Amendment, as assumed by
the Amazon court, then, of course, it does not violate the First
Amendment. But if the government's request for the names of
purchasers and generic product information chills First Amendment
activity (as could be the case under the WI Grand Jury "subjective
concern" standard), then the DOR must demonstrate that it "needs"
the information-i.e., that the DOR has a compelling interest and
that there is a "substantial relation" between its compelling interest
and the specific information sought.223
Given the narrow scope of the DOR's audit ("the DOR's
document request to Amazon is not part of an investigation of North
222. WI Grand Jury, 246 F.R.D. 570, 573 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
223. Id.
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Carolina residents' tax liability"),224 though, the DOR would have a
difficult time showing a compelling need for any information
matching consumers with their purchases, whether detailed or
generic. As explained by the court, Amazon already had provided the
DOR all the information it needed to assess Amazon's maximum
potential sales tax liability.225 For this reason, the Amazon court
rejected the DOR's explanation for wanting detailed customer
purchase information. Because the DOR's desire for detailed
customer purchase information was not "substantially related" to
"calculating Amazon's potential tax liability," the Amazon court held
that the DOR's request violated the First Amendment.2 26 But the
analysis is the same if the DOR requests generic purchase
information.22 7 Given that the DOR already has enough information
to determine Amazon's tax liability, it does not need the identities of
North Carolina purchasers. The court's modified request, therefore,
lacks a substantial nexus between the government's alleged interest
(verifying Amazon's tax liability) and the information sought (the
identities of consumers and generic information about their
purchases).228
Moreover, even if the Amazon court considered the information
request in connection with the potential use tax liability of Amazon's
North Carolina consumers, it is not clear that the request would pass
the heightened scrutiny standard that the court adopted. Because
"the DOR [had] not made a showing that its investigation of Amazon
is the only way to acquire such information,"2 29 the court's modified
request would not be the "least restrictive means" of obtaining the
desired information?30 The DOR could pursue a variety of actions to
improve use tax compliance without infringing on the First
Amendment rights of North Carolina consumers-e.g., conducting an
enhanced educational campaign to inform taxpayers about their
224. Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1164 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
225. Id. at 1169.
226. Id.
227. As the Maryland Supreme Court held in Lubin v. Agora, Inc., "[a]lthough access
to this information might be useful to the Division's investigation, the State has not shown
that it has any compelling need for its disclosure." 882 A.2d 833, 847 (Md. 2005).
228. Amazon, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 ("There must also be a 'substantial relation
between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state
interest.'" (quoting Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 546
(1963))).
229. Id. at 1164.
230. Id. at 1169.
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obligations,23 ' enforcing its Amazon law, pursuing other types of
legislation that might avoid Quil, and auditing individual taxpayers.
Thus, whether the Amazon court's modified relief violates the First
Amendment rights of North Carolina consumers depends in large
measure on the standard that a court uses to determine whether such
an information request chills speech. Therefore, if the DOR decides
to issue a new request for information consistent with the Amazon
court's order, it should be prepared to argue that a reasonable person
standard should govern the court's analysis of whether the request
chills First Amendment activity.
III. A POSSIBLE NEXT STEP IN NORTH CAROLINA'S USE TAX
COLLECTION EFFORTS: A USE TAX REPORTING STATUTE
With over $18 billion in North American sales last year, Amazon
is a major player in the e-commerce world, but it is, of course, only
one of the thousands of internet retailers. Moreover, pursuing
Amazon alone does little to capture the majority of the estimated
$160 to $180 million in use taxes that currently go unpaid in North
Carolina.232 As a result, the DOR may look to expand its efforts to
obtain customer purchase information by seeking the same
information from other retailers. This would enable the DOR to
pursue additional delinquent North Carolina taxpayers directly.
Given the Washington district court's decision, North Carolina
seems to have two primary ways to expand its use tax information
collection efforts. First, the DOR could audit more companies that do
not collect sales or use tax ("non-collecting retailers") and issue
information requests modeled after the district court's modified
relief. If the courts adopted a reasonable purchaser standard, then, as
we discuss above, such requests might survive First Amendment
challenges. But audits are costly, time-consuming, and often lead to
litigation, as demonstrated by the Amazon case. For these reasons,
North Carolina might instead consider a second option-enacting a
statute pursuant to which all non-collecting retailers would have to
report purchases by North Carolina customers to the DOR. In effect,
North Carolina would seek customer purchase information from all
remote retailers, removing the need to audit individual companies to
get information about North Carolina purchasers. To date, one other
231. Govind S. Iyer et al., Successfully Increasing Compliancein Washimgton State, TAX
ANALYSTS: SPECIAL REPORT, July 6, 2010, at 9 (analyzing the effect on use tax
compliance of Washington's efforts to educate its taxpayers about their use tax
obligations).
232. BRUCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 11.
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state, Colorado, has taken this approach by passing the first use tax
reporting statute in 2010.233 Based on the interest of other states in
enacting similar statutes, the Multistate Tax Commission ("MTC") 23 4
is currently drafting a model use tax reporting statute using the
Colorado law as a template.23 5
Although an attractive solution to North Carolina's use tax
collection problems, a use tax reporting statute presents its own
potential constitutional concerns around which North Carolina would
have to navigate. For example, in January 2011, a federal district
court in Colorado entered an order enjoining the state's use tax
reporting statute236 while the Direct Marketing Association237 (the
"DMA") and the Colorado Department of Revenue litigate the
statute's constitutionality. Although the DMA contends that
requiring non-collecting retailers to report information about their
sales violates both the dormant Commerce Clause and the First
Amendment, the Colorado federal district court's preliminary
injunction order focused only on the dormant Commerce Clause
claim, finding that there was a substantial likelihood that the
reporting statute violates this constitutional doctrine. 238 As we discuss
below, contrary to the Colorado court's analysis, there is reason to
believe that a Colorado-style reporting statute could survive dormant
Commerce Clause review.
But the dormant Commerce Clause is not the only hurdle facing
such a reporting statute. After examining how the statute operates
233. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5) (2010).
234. The Multistate Tax Commission "is an intergovernmental state tax agency
working on behalf of states and taxpayers to administer, equitably and efficiently, tax laws
that apply to multistate and multinational enterprises." About the Multistate Tax
Commission, MULTISTATE TAX COMM'N, http://www.mtc.gov/About.aspx?id=40 (last
visited Aug. 22, 2011).
235. For a copy of the draft model statute, see SALES & USE TAX UNIFORMITY
SuBCOMM., MULTISTATE TAX COMM'N, DRAFT MODEL SALES & USE TAX NOTICE AND
REPORT ACT (2011), available athttp://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/MultistateTax
_Commission/Uniformity/Minutes/Model% 20Use% 2OTax% 20Notice% 20and% 20Reporti
ng% 20Act%201-28-11%20Showing% 20Markup%20from% 20December%207(3).pdf.
236. Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber,
No. 10-cv-1546-REB-CBS, 2011 WL 250556 (D. Colo. Jan. 26, 2011) [hereinafter DMA
Injunctioni, available athttp://www.the-dma.org/segment/segmentfiles/catalogers
/201101260rderGrantingPl.pdf.
237. The Complaint in the action describes the DMA as "the nation's largest trade
association of organizations marketing products directly to consumers via mail order,
telephone orders, and the Internet." Complaint at 1 2, Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, No.
10-cv-1546-REB-CBS (D. Colo. June 30, 2010), available athttp://www.digestiblelaw.com
/files/Uploads/D ocuments/D MA% 20Complaint.pdf.
238. DMA Injunction, supra note 236, at 5. The challengers did not argue the First
Amendment claim in their preliminary injunction motion.
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and the Commerce Clause issues it raises, we consider an issue that
no court has yet addressed-whether the reporting statute violates
the First Amendment. Unlike the court's modified relief entered in
the Amazon case, both the Colorado reporting statute and the draft
MTC reporting statute do not call for any information about the
goods purchased. Instead, these statutes ask only for the total amount
of purchases by the individual consumer from the retailer. But even
this most "generic" of information reporting requirements could
implicate the First Amendment when applied to some retailers.
Therefore, North Carolina legislators would have to draft the
reporting statute to exempt certain retailers or categories of
expressive materials. This would present a difficult line-drawing
exercise that ultimately may reduce the statute's effectiveness.
Therefore, we conclude that while North Carolina should consider
enacting a Colorado-style reporting statute, such a statute, standing
alone, will not solve the state's serious use tax compliance problem.
A. A Model for North Carolna?-The Colorado Use Tax Reporting
Statute
In 2010, when the Colorado General Assembly first considered
enacting legislation to address the problem of use tax non-
compliance, it considered an Amazon law similar to those enacted in
New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island.239 Given concerns that
Amazon and other major out-of-state internet retailers would
terminate their commission agreements with Colorado marketing
companies (as they had in North Carolina and Rhode Island), the
Colorado legislature decided against an Amazon law. Instead, the
General Assembly passed House Bill 10-1193 ("HB 1193"),240
Colorado's use tax reporting statute.
Unlike an "Amazon" law, HB 1193 neither seeks to avoid Quill
by imputing physical presence nexus based on click-through
agreements, nor requires remote retailers to collect use taxes. 24 1
Rather, the statute imposes reporting requirements on non-collecting
239. Chuck Berry, Guest Commentary, Ignoring the Impact of Tax Increases on
Businesses, DENVER POST, Feb. 22, 2010, http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci 14445194.
240. Act of Feb. 24, 2010, ch. 9, 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 54 (codified at COLO. REV.
STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5) (2010)). Ironically, despite the fact that HB 1193 does not impose
physical presence nexus based on marketing relationships, Amazon still elected to
terminate its commission agreements with Colorado marketing companies after enactment
of the statute. See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Amazon Hits Back at Colorado Web Sales Tax,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2010, at B4, available athttp://online.wsj.com/article
/SBl0001424052748704869304575110040812179072.html.
241. Ch. 9, 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws 54.
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retailers that serve two purposes: (i) an educational function,
notifying Colorado purchasers of their obligation to pay use tax on
goods purchased from non-collecting retailers, and (ii) a verification
function, allowing the Colorado Department of Revenue to
determine whether Colorado purchasers are in fact paying the use tax
they owe. 242 To accomplish these goals, HB 1193 requires non-
collecting retailers to:
i. provide notice with each sale to a Colorado purchaser 243 that
the purchase is not exempt from Colorado sales or use tax
merely because it is made over the internet and that the
purchaser may be required to pay tax to the Department of
Revenue (the "Transactional Notice"); 244
ii. provide an annual summary to Colorado purchasers of
purchases made during the previous calendar year if the
purchaser bought more than $500 in goods from the retailer
over that period (the "Annual Customer Report"); 24 5 and
242. Id.
243. For the regulatory definition of a "Colorado purchaser," see COLO. CODE REGS.
§ 39-21-l12(3.5)(1)(b) (2010).
244. SeeCOLO. DEP'T OF REVENUE, FYI SALES 79, SALES OF TAXABLE ITEMS OVER
THE INTERNET 2 (2010), available athttp://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satelliteblobcol=urldata
&blobheader=application/pdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere= 125166
8367920&ssbinary-true. The Transaction Notice must:
* State that the retailer does not collect Colorado sales or use tax.
* State that the purchase is not exempt from Colorado sales or use tax merely
because it is made over the Internet or by other remote means.
* State that the State of Colorado requires Colorado purchasers to file a sales or
use tax return at the end of the year for all taxable Colorado purchases that
were not taxed, and pay tax on those purchases.
* The notice must be easily seen and located near the total price.
Id.
245. Under Department of Revenue guidance, the Annual Customer Report must:
* Be sent by first class mail to the last known address by January 31 of the
following year in an envelope prominently marked with the words "Important
Tax Document Enclosed.
* Summarize the date(s) of purchase(s), a general description of the item(s) (e.g.,
"books," "consumer electronics," "household appliances") and the dollar
amount(s) of the purchase(s).
* State that the State of Colorado requires that the consumer file a sales or use
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iii. file an annual report with the Department of Revenue
identifying each Colorado purchaser and setting forth the total
amount of purchases by the purchaser from the retailer during
the prior calendar year, without separating purchases into
categories or providing any information about the products
purchased other than the aggregate purchase amount (the
"Annual Retailer Report").2 46
The Transactional Notice and Annual Customer Report inform
Colorado purchasers that they are required to pay use taxes, while the
Annual Retailer Report assists the Colorado Department of Revenue
in determining whether Colorado purchasers have complied with that
obligation.
Colorado's reporting statute provides an exemption for any non-
collecting retailer with gross sales of less than $100,000 in Colorado.24 7
But a retailer that exceeds this de minimis exemption and fails to
comply with the reporting requirements is subject to substantial
penalties. In particular, each separate failure to provide a
Transactional Notice subjects the non-collecting retailer to a $5
penalty.248 Each failure to provide either an Annual Customer Report
or an Annual Retailer Report carries a $10 penalty.249 Although the
Colorado Department of Revenue's regulatory guidance limits these
penalties in the first year, a non-collecting retailer is required to meet
the reporting requirements of HB 1193,250 and such retailers still
confront the possibility of hefty fines for failing to comply with the
reporting requirements.
tax return at the end of every year and pay the tax on Colorado purchases
that did not include tax.
* Indicate that the retailer is required by law to provide the Colorado
Department of Revenue the total dollar amount of purchases made by
Colorado consumers, however no information about the purchases other than
the dollar amount will be provided.
Id.
246. The annual retailer report must include: "The name(s) of all the Colorado
purchasers; [tihe billing address of all the Colorado purchasers; [tihe shipping addresses of
all the Colorado purchasers; [t]he total dollar amount of purchases made by each customer
in Colorado for the previous year." Id.
247. COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-2 1-112(3.5)(1)(a)(iii) (2010). The exemption considers
the amount of sales in the previous year and the expected sales in the current year.
248. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)(c)(II) (2010).
249. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(III).
250. COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-112(3.5)(2)(f), (3)(d), (4)(f).
2064 [Vol. 89
2011] USE TAX ENFORCEMENT INN.CAROLINA
1. North Carolina and the Dormant Commerce Clause Challenge to
a Colorado-Style Reporting Statute
In granting the DMA's preliminary injunction motion against
HB 1193, the Colorado federal district court relied on two dormant
Commerce Clause arguments. First, the court found that the DMA
had shown a substantial likelihood that the reporting requirements do
what the dormant Commerce Clause forbids-discriminate against
interstate commerce. 251 Specifically, the court held that HB 1193
discriminates "because, in practical effect, [it] impose[s] a burden on
interstate commerce that is not imposed on in-state commerce."252
Second, the court found that the reporting requirements most likely
violate Quills physical presence requirement because out-of-state
retailers are required to comply with a statute that has as its "sole
purpose" the goal of "enhanc[ing] the collection of use taxes by the
State of Colorado." 25 3 Given that (i) Quill prohibits the state from
requiring out-of-state retailers to collect use tax and (ii) HB 1193's
reporting requirements relate solely to the collection of use tax, the
district court concluded that Quill also prohibits the state from
requiring out-of-state retailers to comply with these reporting
requirements. 25 4
In concluding that HB 1193 discriminates against interstate
commerce though, the court failed to consider whether the disparate
treatment of out-of-state retailers was based on legitimate, non-
protectionist reasons. The Supreme Court has indicated in its recent
decisions that these are relevant considerations, signaling a somewhat
more permissive approach to its dormant Commerce Clause
analysis. 255 Moreover, this Article contends that the Colorado court
inappropriately extended Quills physical presence requirement to
Colorado's reporting statute. Given that reporting statutes do not
impose the same administrative burdens as tax collection statutes, the
Court's analysis in Quill should not be extended to reporting
requirements. Quills physical presence requirement was predicated,
in part, on the substantial burden created by a company's having to
track numerous tax rates for jurisdictions across the country.25 6 This
251. DMA Injunction, supra note 236, at 4.
252. Id. at 7.
253. Id. at 10.
254. Id.
255. See infra Part III.A.3.
256. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992). Quill also relied on stare
decisis grounds in reaching its holding, as the Court re-affirmed the physical presence
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concern, though, does not apply to the disclosure of information that
companies already keep and maintain. In addition, rather than
erecting a barrier to disadvantage out-of-state commerce, a use tax
reporting statute actually seeks to promote the principles underlying
the dormant Commerce Clause by reducing the artificial competitive
advantage enjoyed by out-of-state retailers resulting from consumers'
almost complete disregard for their use tax obligation. Therefore, this
Article contends that use tax reporting statutes, whether enacted in
Colorado or North Carolina, should survive dormant Commerce
Clause review, the Colorado federal court's decision to grant a
preliminary injunction notwithstanding.
2. The Dormant Commerce Clause and Discrimination Against
Interstate Commerce
The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress "to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." 257 It
says nothing about the protection of interstate commerce in the
absence of congressional action. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Commerce Clause to have a "negative sweep as well,
... prohibit[ing] certain state actions that interfere with interstate
commerce."258
The historical context of the Commerce Clause helps to explain
why use tax reporting statutes comport with, rather than violate, the
principles underlying the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The
Framers gave Congress broad power over interstate commerce to
prevent "the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had
plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States
under the Articles of Confederation."25 9 Left to pursue their own
economic interests, states enacted protective tariffs against goods
standard introduced twenty-five years earlier in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department
ofRevenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967). Quill, 504 U.S. at 317.
257. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
258. Quill, 504 U.S. at 309.
259. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979); see also W. Lynn Creamery v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994) ("The 'negative' aspect of the Commerce Clause was
considered the more important by the 'father of the Constitution,' James Madison. In one
of his letters, Madison wrote that the Commerce Clause 'grew out of the abuse of the
power by the importing States in taxing the non-importing, and was intended as a negative
and preventive provision against injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a
power to be used for the positive purposes of the General Government.'" (quoting MAX
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (1911))).
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brought into a state by out-of-state merchants.2 60 These tariffs
prevented outsiders from competing on equal footing with local
businesses. 2 6' As Justice Jackson explained, the Commerce Clause
provided the national government with the means to protect
nationwide commerce:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every
farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by
the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the
Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and
no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude
them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free
competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect
him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the
Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has
given it reality.262
Thus, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine developed as a
means of preventing the states from creating artificial barriers to the
free flow of commercial goods to protect local merchants from fair
and robust competition by "outsiders." This concern over
protectionist legislation explains why the modern test for assessing
whether a state statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause
involves a determination of whether the statute "discriminates"
against interstate commerce. 263 This determination is critical because
if a statute discriminates, it is subjected to strict scrutiny, which is
almost always fatal to the state legislation. On the other hand, a
"nondiscriminatory" statute challenged under the dormant
Commerce Clause is subjected to the less rigorous (though highly
unpredictable) Pike balancing test, which requires the court to weigh
the statute's benefits and burdens. 2" As explained by one scholar:
260. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 312 ("Under the Articles of Confederation, state taxes and
duties hindered and suppressed interstate commerce; the Framers intended the Commerce
Clause as a cure for these structural ills.").
261. W Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 193 ("The paradigmatic example of a law
discriminating against interstate commerce is the protective tariff or customs duty, which
taxes goods imported from other States, but does not tax similar products produced in
State.").
262. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
263. The only cases in which a "discriminatory" law survives under the dormant
Commerce Clause relate to issues of health and safety or the integrity of natural resources.
See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 142-43, 151-52 (1986) (upholding a statute
prohibiting the importation of out-of-state baitfish to prevent the introduction of parasites
or non-native species); Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439, 443-44 (1939) (upholding a
quarantine law because of the safety issues involved).
264. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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For those state or local laws that "discriminate," on their face
or in their purposes or effects, against interstate commerce or
interstate commercial actors, strict scrutiny applies, requiring
the government to demonstrate a legitimate (i.e., non-
protectionist) purpose for the law, and that there are no less
discriminatory means to effectuate that interest. It is a test that
is nearly always fatal in fact. For nondiscriminatory measures
that nevertheless burden interstate commerce, a deferential
balancing test is employed: to prevail, the challenger must
demonstrate that the burdens on interstate commerce are
"clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."265
The initial inquiry, then, in assessing a use tax reporting
requirement under the dormant Commerce Clause is to determine
whether the statute discriminates in purpose or effect against
interstate commerce or interstate commercial actors. To make this
determination, courts typically consider whether the statute under
review treats in-state economic interests more favorably than out-of-
state economic interests. As explained by the Supreme Court in
Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of Environmental Quality,266 a
law discriminates if it imposes "differential treatment of in-state and
out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens
the latter."267 The discrimination in Oregon Waste Systems was
apparent on the face of the statute-Oregon placed a higher
surcharge on the transfer and handling of out-of-state waste brought
into Oregon than on the transfer and handling of in-state waste.2 68
Moreover, the different surcharges were based solely on the waste's
geographic place of origin rather than on any characteristic of out-of-
state waste that would make it more costly to handle than in-state
waste.269 Because Oregon offered no reason for charging a higher fee
on out-of-state waste based on the nature of the waste rather than its
place of origin,270 the Court found Oregon's statute discriminated
against interstate commerce.
265. Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50
WM.&MARYL.REv.417,421-22(2008).
266. 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
267. Id. at 99.
268. Id. at 96.
269. Id. at 101.
270. Id. at 106. The justification that Oregon offered for the surcharge was that in-state
companies bore other tax burdens that out-of-state companies did not have to bear,
including state income taxes. As a result, higher surcharge on companies disposing of out-
of-state waste helped to level the competitive market between in-state and out-of-state
companies. In effect, Oregon argued that the surcharge on out-of-state waste served as a
compensatory tax. The Court, however, found that the additional tax burden borne by in-
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The Colorado federal district court in DMA applied this
"differential treatment" standard to conclude that HB 1193
discriminates against interstate commerce. 271 Although on its face HB
1193 applies even-handedly to all non-collecting retailers, whether in-
state or out-of-state, in practice the statute's reporting requirements
apply only to out-of-state retailers because in-state retailers are
required, subject to civil and criminal penalties, to collect Colorado
sales tax. 27 2 Therefore, in-state retailers are not "non-collecting
retailers" under HB 1193, and the reporting requirements never apply
to them. Because the reporting requirements apply only to out-of-
state retailers, the Colorado court concluded that HB 1193
discriminates against interstate commerce under Oregon Waste
Systems.273
After finding HB 1193 to be discriminatory, the DMA court
applied the dormant Commerce Clause's strict scrutiny standard of
review to the statute.274 Under this heightened standard, the court
considered whether the state would be able to " 'justify [the reporting
requirements] both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the
statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives
adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.' "275 But despite
acknowledging that Colorado's "need to collect tax revenue"
constitutes a "legitimate local interest,"27 6 the court found at least one
non-discriminatory alternative for achieving this interest: the state
could provide a line on the Colorado income tax return where
taxpayers could report the use taxes they owe. 277 Because allowing
taxpayers the opportunity to report their use tax liability on their
income tax return could improve use tax compliance without
state companies related to an activity (generation of income) qualitatively different than
the activity to which the surcharge on out-of-state waste applied (hauling waste). It
therefore rejected Oregon's compensatory tax argument. Id. at 102.
271. DMA Injunction, supra note 236, at 4.
272. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 39-26-103(4), 26-104(1)(a), 21-118(2) (2010).
273. DMA Injunction, supra note 236, at 4.
274. See Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99 (stating that discriminatory statutes are
"virtually per se invalid").
275. DMA Injunction, supra note 236, at 7-8 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 336 (1979)).
276. Id. at 8.
277. Id. at 8. Unlike North Carolina (and approximately two dozen other states),
Colorado provides no line on its income tax return to report use taxes owed and instead
requires taxpayers to file a separate use tax return. See NINA MANZI, MINN. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, USE TAX COLLECTION ON INCOME TAX RETURNS IN OTHER
STATES 5 (2010), available at http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/usetax.pdf
(stating that twenty-three states with sales and use taxes allow for reporting of the use tax
liability on the state's income tax form).
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discriminating against out-of-state retailers, 278 the court found that the
more onerous reporting statute would likely fail strict scrutiny. 279 The
court, therefore, granted the DMA's preliminary injunction motion.
3. An Alternate Approach: Disparate, But Not Discriminatory,
Treatment
In concluding that HB 1193 discriminates against out-of-state
retailers, the DMA court relied on the Supreme Court's seemingly
unequivocal statement in Oregon Waste Systems that discrimination
means "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter."280 But
recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that the application of this
definition is not as straightforward as the DMA court assumed. In
Wyoming v. Oklahoma,28 1 the Court acknowledged that there may be
no "clear line" for determining when a statute discriminates (and is
subject to strict scrutiny) and when it does not (and falls under the
more lenient Pike balancing test reserved for non-discriminatory
statutes). 28 2  In fact, the Court has indicated elsewhere that
discrimination, "in the constitutionally prohibited sense," requires
more than just differential treatment; it also requires courts to
consider whether the state statute is a "protectionist enactment." 283
278. North Carolina's experience has been that providing a use tax line on the income
tax return may constitute an alternative, but not an effective one. For the nine year period
from 2000 to 2008, an average of only 3% of taxpayers filing North Carolina individual
income tax returns included on their returns any amount of use taxes owed. Email from
Beth Stevenson to Andrew Haile, supra note 65.
279. If North Carolina adopts a use tax reporting statute similar to HB 1193, the North
Carolina statute would arguably have a better chance of surviving a challenge (even under
a strict scrutiny standard) because the state already allows taxpayers to report use tax
liability on their state income tax returns. Of course, other alternatives for improving use
tax compliance still exist, such as a well-funded public education campaign or an increase
in audits. The Supreme Court stated in Maine v. Taylor, however, that the "abstract
possibility" of alternatives, "particularly when there is no assurance as to their
effectiveness" does not render invalid a state statute even if that statute discriminates
against interstate commerce. 477 U.S. 131, 147 (1986) (quoting United States v. Taylor,
585 F. Supp. 393, 398 (1984)). Maine v. Taylor appears to support the position that any
non-discriminatory alternative must be (1) realistic and (2) at least marginally effective, to
invalidate a statute. See id.
280. Oregon Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
281. 502 U.S. 437 (1992).
282. Id. at 455 n.12 (quoting Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)). The Court in Brown-Forman went on to state that in
determining what standard of review to apply to a statute under the dormant Commerce
Clause, the "critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local and
interstate activity." 476 U.S. at 579.
283. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
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Under the Supreme Court's more recent precedent, some cases of
disparate treatment may not constitute discriminatory treatment if the
parties subject to the disparate treatment are not similarly situated. In
other words, the Court has recognized that disparate treatment may
not always amount to the "protectionism" the dormant Commerce
Clause was intended to prevent.
a. No Discrimination ifNot "Similarly Situated"
In General Motors Corp. v. Tracy,284 the Supreme Court upheld
an Ohio statute that in its effect treated out-of-state companies
differently than in-state companies.285 Under the Ohio law, "natural
gas companies" were exempted from the state's general sales tax even
though only in-state companies satisfied the statutory definition of
the term.286 While out-of-state producers and independent marketers
of natural gas had to collect Ohio sales and use tax for any gas they
sold into Ohio, "natural gas companies" (called "local distribution
companies" or "LDCs" throughout the Court's opinion) did not.287
General Motors, a major consumer of natural gas from out-of-state
companies, filed suit alleging that the application of Ohio's general
sales and use tax to out-of-state gas suppliers, but not to LDCs,
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.288
Even though the Ohio statute effectively imposed sales and use
taxes only on out-of-state companies, the Court held that the statute
did not discriminate against interstate commerce. 28 9 According to the
Court, the in-state and out-of-state companies were not similarly
situated and, consequently, did not have to be treated the same:
Conceptually, of course, any notion of discrimination assumes a
comparison of substantially similar entities. Although this
central assumption has more often than not itself remained
dormant in this Court's opinions on state discrimination subject
to review under the dormant Commerce Clause, when the
allegedly competing entities provide different products, as here,
there is a threshold question whether the companies are indeed
similarly situated for constitutional purposes. 290
284. 519 U.S. 278 (1997).
285. Id. at 310.
286. Id. at 282.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 285.
289. Id. at 310.
290. Id. at 298-99.
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Although the LDCs and out-of-state natural gas producers
provided the same fungible good to Ohio customers-natural gas-
the Court found that these gas suppliers actually provided different
"products," and therefore were not similarly situated.2 9 1 Under Ohio
law, LDCs had to submit annual supply and demand forecasts to the
Utilities Commission, "comply with a range of accounting, reporting,
and disclosure rules, and get permission from the ... Utilities
Commission to issue securities or even enter into certain contracts."29 2
LDCs also had "to serve all members of the public" throughout their
areas of operation, "were required to provide a firm backup supply of
gas," and had "to assure a degree of continued service to low-income
customers despite unpaid bills." 293 None of these regulations and
requirements applied to out-of-state natural gas suppliers.
Accordingly, the Court found that the LDCs "provide[d] a product
consisting of gas bundled with the services and protections" required
under Ohio's regulatory regime, while the out-of-state natural gas
producers provided natural gas "unbundled" from the services and
protections imposed by state regulation. 294 As a result, because in-
state and out-of-state natural gas suppliers were not similarly situated
for dormant Commerce Clause purposes, giving the Ohio sales and
use tax exclusion only to LDCs did not discriminate against interstate
commerce. 29 5
Under GeneralMotors, then, differential treatment by itself does
not amount to discrimination triggering strict scrutiny. Rather, the
state statute must differentiate between similarly situated in-state and
out-of-state entities. But in-state and out-of-state retailers are not
similarly situated with respect to their sales and use tax obligations.
Like the LDCs in GeneralMotors, in-state retailers must comply with
an extensive regulatory regime involving sales and use tax collection
and remission that states cannot apply to out-of-state retailers in the
wake of Quill.29 6 Using the Court's terminology in General Motors, in-
state retailers effectively sell different "products" (goods bundled
with sales and use tax collected at the time of purchase) than out-of-
state retailers sell (goods that require consumers to determine and
remit use taxes on their own). That is, because the state can impose
291. Id. at 299.
292. Id. at 295-96 (internal citations omitted).
293. Id. at 297.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 310.
296. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-164 to -187 (2009) (setting forth over fifty
statutes comprising North Carolina's sales and use tax laws).
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tax collection requirements on in-state retailers but not on out-of-
state retailers, in-state and out-of-state retailers are not in the same
position with respect to the need for reporting requirements. As a
result, the state can provide for disparate treatment under use tax
reporting statutes without impermissibly discriminating against
interstate commerce.9
b. North Carolina Has a Legitimate, Non-Protectionist Basis for
Adopting a Reporting Statute
If North Carolina adopts a reporting statute along the lines of
HB 1193, it could avoid strict scrutiny by advancing a legitimate, non-
protectionist basis for applying the reporting requirements to out-of-
state retailers. Given that in-state retailers are required, under threat
of civil and criminal penalty, to collect sales tax, consumers do not
owe use tax on in-state purchases.298 As a result, use tax non-
compliance simply does not exist with respect to in-state retailers.
The problem arises only in relation to sales by out-of-state retailers.
That is, because in-state retailers already collect sales taxes, and
therefore are subject to a burden that does not apply to out-of-state
retailers, a state has no reason to require them to report information
regarding use tax collection.
In fact, the Supreme Court has indicated that disparate treatment
may not be discriminatory if a legitimate reason underlies the
disparate treatment. In Philadelphia v. New Jersey,2 99 the Court
considered the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the
importation of "solid or liquid waste which originated . . . outside
[New Jersey's] territorial limits" into the state. 30 0 The Court
determined that the New Jersey statute discriminated against
interstate commerce, but in reaching this conclusion it stated that
"whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose [for prohibiting the
importation of waste], it may not be accomplished by discriminating
against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless
there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them
297. Of course, this does not mean that states with sales and use taxes are free to enact
any legislation, no matter how onerous, that falls on out-of-state retailers but not on in-
state retailers. First, protectionist legislation is still subject to strict scrutiny. Moreover, any
form of legislation, which, while not discriminatory, still affects interstate commerce,
would be subject to the balancing test applicable to non-discriminatory statutes. See infra
text accompanying notes 306-25 for a description of this balancing test.
298. See, e.g., § 105-164.6(c) (allowing consumers a credit against their use tax for any
sales tax paid).
299. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
300. Id. at 618.
2073
NORTH CAROLINA LA WREVIEW
differently."01 That is, the Court suggested that states may
differentiate if there is a reason for disparate treatment other than the
extraterritorial origin of the regulated good or entity.
In the use tax context, there is an appropriate reason for treating
sales by retailers with no in-state physical presence differently than
sales by retailers that have an in-state presence. Out-of-state retailers
are not required to collect sales taxes and, as a result, can offer their
products at a cheaper price. The state must rely on consumers to
report and pay use taxes on those sales, which, if paid, make the total
cost of the good the same as if it was purchased in-state. But as
empirical evidence indicates, consumers (in North Carolina, at least)
comply with their use tax obligations at exceptionally low rates-
under 4%.302 On the other hand, statistical data from the North
Carolina DOR indicates that sales tax compliance is substantially
higher, as assessments compared to collections indicate a compliance
rate of well over 90%.303 Therefore, transactions by in-state and out-
of-state retailers differ substantially with respect to the obligations
imposed on the retailers and, consequently, the state's ability to
collect the taxes on internet purchases. As a result, the different
regulatory schemes, coupled with the vastly different tax compliance
rates, constitute a reason apart from the origin of the goods sold for
states to impose the reporting requirements exclusively on out-of-
state retailers.
In addition, removing the artificial price advantage created by
use tax delinquency preserves "the unitary national market" that the
Founders intended the Commerce Clause to protect.3 4 A use tax
reporting statute is not the type of protectionist measure that the
Commerce Clause was meant to prohibit. Unlike import tariffs, which
301. Id. at 626-27 (emphasis added).
302. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68 for an explanation of this figure.
303. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 2010, the DOR reported combined sales and
use tax revenue of over $5.56 billion. N.C. DEP'T OF REVENUE, STATE GENERAL FUND:
TAX REVENUES BY SOURCE 1, available athttp://www.dornc.com/publications/abstract
/2010/table2.pdf. For that same fiscal year, the DOR assessed North Carolina taxpayers
approximately $61.6 million in sales and use tax liability. Email from Beth Stevenson, Dir.
of Pub. Affairs/PIO, N.C. Dep't of Revenue, to Andrew Haile, Associate Professor, Elon
Univ. Sch. of Law (Feb. 10, 2011 14:48 EST) (on file with authors). So, overall sales and
use tax assessments amount to only 1.1% of sales and use tax revenues.
304. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994). In explaining why
tariffs on out-of-state goods are prohibited by the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court
held that such tariffs undermine "the principle of the unitary national market by
handicapping out-of-state competitors, thus artificially encouraging in-state production
even when the same goods could be produced at lower cost in other States." Id. (emphasis
added).
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gave in-state merchants an artificial competitive advantage over out-
of-state competition, reporting requirements seek only to level the
playing field by removing the competitive disadvantage that has
arisen post-Quill. Because out-of-state retailers do not have to collect
sales and use taxes and less than four percent of North Carolinians
pay any use taxes, out-of-state retailers enjoy a de facto price
advantage over in-state sellers. By increasing use tax compliance,
reporting statutes actually encourage, rather than discourage, robust
and fair competition between in-state and out-of-state retailers,
exactly as the Framers intended.
Moreover, reporting requirements do this without eliminating
competitive advantages that out-of-state retailers enjoy independent
of the sales and use tax scheme. While out-of-state retailers who
produce goods at the highest quality and lowest cost normally should
prevail in commercial competition regardless of the place of origin of
those goods,305 the Commerce Clause does not protect their right to
prevail based on the tax delinquency of in-state consumers. Thus,
reporting statutes are constitutionally distinguishable from the state
regulation struck down in Hunt v. Washington StateAppleAdvertising
Commission.306 In Hun4 North Carolina enacted a statute prohibiting
Washington apple growers from using Washington's more stringent
grading system for apples shipped into North Carolina. The ostensible
purpose for the North Carolina statute was to protect North Carolina
citizens from "fraud and deception in the marketing of apples."307 The
Washington apple growers, however, argued that North Carolina
sought to prevent them from marketing their higher grade apples and
expanding their share of the North Carolina apple market.308 The
Supreme Court struck down the statute because, among other
reasons, it had "the effect of stripping away from the Washington
apple industry the competitive and economic advantages it has earned
for itselfthrough its expensive inspection and grading system."309
305. See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense
ofthe Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L REv. 1091, 1118 (1986) ("[P]rotectionism is
inefficient because it diverts business away from presumptively low-cost producers without
any colorable justification in terms of a benefit that deserves approval from the point of
view of the nation as a whole.").
306. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
307. Id. at 349.
308. See id. at 348 (noting that North Carolina challenged the district court's
determination in favor of the Washington apple growers that the statute burdened the
industry by "increasing its costs of doing business in the North Carolina market").
309. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
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But out-of-state retailers have not "earned for themselves" the
price advantage resulting from Quill. As a result, reporting
requirements are not "protectionist." Instead of trying to give in-state
retailers an unfair price advantage, reporting requirements seek to
put in-state retailers on the same level with out-of-state retailers with
respect to the amount of tax ultimately collected on goods sold in or
into North Carolina. They ensure that all retailers-those located in-
state and those with no in-state physical presence-have the same
opportunity to compete for the business of in-state residents.1 o By
increasing the likelihood that consumers who buy from out-of-state
retailers will ultimately pay the taxes owed on their purchases, use tax
reporting statutes help to eliminate the artificial price advantage out-
of-state retailers now have.
4. Pike Balancing-Weighing the Benefits and Burdens of a
Colorado-Style Reporting Statute
Even if a court determines that a reporting statute does not
discriminate, the dormant Commerce Clause analysis is not finished.
State action that affects but does not discriminate against interstate
commerce is still subject to the balancing test set forth by the
Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.311 Under this test, one
challenging a statute must demonstrate that the burdens imposed by
the statute on interstate commerce are "clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits."3 12
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the inherent difficulty
and potential institutional incompetence of the judiciary in weighing
the benefits and burdens of a statute under the dormant Commerce
Clause. In Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, the Court
analyzed whether a state income tax exemption that traditionally had
been given for state-issued bonds violated the dormant Commerce
310. In upholding the constitutionality of the use tax, Justice Cardozo, writing on
behalf of the Court, stated:
When the account is made up, the stranger from afar is subject to no greater
burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within the gates. The one
pays upon one activity or incident, and the other upon another, but the sum is the
same when the reckoning is closed.
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 584 (1937). Likewise, the reporting
requirements ensure that the "stranger from afar" and the "dweller within the gates" both
face the same tax burden in selling their goods, with neither unfairly advantaged over the
other.
311. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
312. Id. at 142.
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Clause.313 Although the exemption gave state-issued bonds special
treatment, the Court declined to apply the Pikebalancing test, stating
that "the Judicial Branch is not institutionally suited to draw reliable
conclusions of the kind that would be necessary for the [plaintiffs] to
satisfy a Pike burden in this particular case."3 14 The Court explained
that identifying the benefits and burdens and then "weighing or
quantifying them for a cost-benefit analysis would be a very subtle
exercise,"" one for which the Court was not qualified. Moreover, the
Court's concerns about institutional competence were heightened in
relation to the tax statutes at issue in Davis: "Courts as institutions
are poorly equipped to evaluate with precision the relative burdens of
various methods of taxation. The complexities of factual economic
proof always present a certain potential for error, and courts have
little familiarity with the process of evaluating the relative economic
burden of taxes." 3 16
Concurring in part in Davis, Justice Scalia expressed skepticism
over the Court's ability to weigh benefits and burdens under the Pike
balancing test. According to Justice Scalia, attempting to balance
benefits and burdens in dormant Commerce Clause cases was like
trying to determine "whether three apples are better than six
tangerines." "31 Under the balancing test, the Court must compare
incommensurate things-alleged burdens on interstate commercial
activity and the perceived benefits to local, intrastate activities. As
Justice Scalia stated in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco
Enterprises,318 "[t]his process is ordinarily called 'balancing,' but the
scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the interests on both
sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular
313. 553 U.S. 328 (2008).
314. Id. at 353.
315. Id. at 354.
316. Id. at 355 (quoting Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 342 (1996)). While use
tax reporting statutes are not tax statutes, the benefit-burden analysis under Pike would
require an assessment of economic factors similar to those involved in weighing the costs
and benefits of tax statutes. For example, in Davis the Court doubted its ability to assess
the challenger's arguments that the state tax exemption for state-issued bonds harmed (i)
out-of-state sellers; (ii) in-state buyers; (iii) the national securities market; and (iv) other
states that felt compelled to enact similar laws but thereby reduced their bond yield
revenue. See id. Many of these same arguments could be made by opponents of reporting
statutes, specifically, that they harm (i) out-of-state sellers; (ii) in-state consumers; (iii) the
efficiency of the national retail market; and (iv) states that enact similar use tax reporting
statutes and thereby drive away out-of-state retailers who prefer not to deal with the
burden imposed.
317. Id. at 360 (Scalia, J., concurring).
318. 486 U.S. 888 (1988).
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line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.""' Whereas General
Motors held that the in-state and out-of-state gas producers must be
similarly situated, critics of Pike balancing contend that the test seeks
to compare dissimilar national and local interests.32 0
Despite acknowledging the difficulties inherent in the test, the
Court continues to apply it.321 As a result, a court may have to weigh
the benefits and burdens created by any reporting statute that North
Carolina might adopt. The local benefits, of course, include the
expected increase in tax revenues due to improved use tax
enforcement. One study has estimated Colorado's lost revenues from
use tax non-compliance on internet purchases (not including other
forms of remote commerce, like mail order purchases) at $130 million
for 2010.322 North Carolina's use tax deficiency for 2010 has been
estimated to be $160 to $180 million.3 23 Although use tax reporting
requirements may not enable states to collect the full amount of these
delinquencies, they will assist states in identifying and pursuing the
worst use tax scofflaws.
In addition, confronted with increased enforcement of use tax
laws, taxpayers who are not themselves assessed by the taxing
authority will likely increase their use tax compliance instead of
waiting to be audited, taxed, and penalized as a result of information
reported under the statute. That is, the DOR's obtaining information
about each person's use tax liability will help to eliminate the
perception that taxpayers can ignore their use tax obligations with
impunity.32 4 As explained by one scholar, "[t]he taxpayer's perception
319. Id. at 897 (Scalia, J., concurring). One respected commentator has argued that
while courts purport to engage in a balancing analysis under the Commerce Clause, all
that they actually do (and all they should do) is to determine whether the challenged
statute has a protectionist purpose. See Regan, supra note 305, at 1092 ("In the central
area of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence . . . the Court has been concerned
exclusively with preventing states from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism.").
320. See United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 348 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring); Denning, supra note 265, at 453.
321. But see David S. Day, The "Mature" Rehnquist Court and the Dormant Commerce
Clause Doctrine: The Expanded Discrimination Tier, 52 S.D. L. REV. 1, 47-50 (2007)
(contending that although the Supreme Court still purports to use a two-tiered test in
dormant Commerce Clause cases, in the twelve dormant Commerce Clause cases decided
between 1992 and 2005 the Court found reasons not to apply the Pike balancing test to any
of the cases). A plurality of the Court did apply the Pikebalancing test in the 2007 United
Haulers case, so the test appears to have continued vitality. See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at
346-47.
322. BRUCE ET AL., supra note 3, at 11.
323. Id.
324. The IRS has studied and tried to quantify the indirect deterrent effect that
enforcing tax laws against some taxpayers has on the compliance rate of others. See, e.g.,
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of the probability that cheating will be detected influences the
compliance decision. Accordingly, any information that the taxpayer
knows the government has about the taxpayer's activities will foster
honesty."3 25 In addition, because the reporting statute's Transaction
Notice and Annual Customer Report components serve an
educational function, some taxpayers who were unaware of their use
tax obligations will learn about these requirements, thereby
increasing the opportunities for compliance.
Finally, with respect to the benefit side of the Pike balancing
scale, reducing widespread use tax evasion may be regarded as a
benefit in and of itself (i.e., regardless of the additional revenue
recovered). The government has an important interest in ensuring
that its laws are followed, and broad-based disregard for the tax
laws-whether out of ignorance or intent-undermines both the
stability of a tax system based on self-assessment and the general
respect for and adherence to the law. Thus, given the importance of
the taxing scheme and the historically low compliance rate, a court
might consider improved use tax compliance resulting from the
reporting requirements to be a significant benefit to the overall tax
system.
On the other side of the Pike balancing ledger, out-of-state
retailers have argued in the Colorado litigation that the reporting
requirements are costly, time-consuming, and unduly burden
interstate commerce.326 Whereas the Colorado Department of
Revenue's expert estimated that "the smallest retailers affected by
[HB 1193, those with over $100,000 of in-state gross sales,] will incur
first year compliance costs ranging from about 3,100 dollars to 7,000
dollars,"3 27 the DMA estimated compliance costs at "upwards of
$26,500" in the first-year, and "perhaps $9,000 annually thereafter,
plus mailing/postage expense ."328 Given that these costs fall only on
out-of-state retailers that are not themselves liable for use tax
JEFFREY A. DUBIN, CAL. INST. OF TECH., CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION ENFORCEMENT
ACTIVITIES AND TAXPAYER NONCOMPLIANCE 21(2004), available athttp://www.irs.gov
/pub/irs-soi/04dubin.pdf (stating that "an additional dollar allocated to audit would return
$58 in general deterrence" based on IRS data from 1988 through 2001); see also Joseph
Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the Cash Economy, 117 TAX NOTES
506, 511 (2007) ("By now almost everyone knows the tremendous bang for the buck we
get with third-party reporting.").
325. Lederman, supra note 42, at 1735.
326. DMA Injunction, supra note 236, at 4-5.
327. Id. at 6.
328. Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant's Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 6, Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Huber, No. 10-CV-01546, 2011 WL
250556-REB-CBS (D. Colo. 2011).
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collection under Quill, the Colorado court in its preliminary
injunction order was understandably troubled by the financial
burden.329
Thus, a court analyzing the impact of a reporting statute on
interstate commerce must identify the relative benefits and burdens
and then balance them against each other. When conducting the
balancing, though, courts must remember that it is "not the purpose
of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate
commerce from their just share of [the] state tax burden even though
it increases the cost of doing business."3 30 Although the reporting
statute is not a tax, it assists the state in enforcing a tax. And even
though North Carolina cannot require remote retailers to collect and
remit use taxes, the state could argue that access to its retail market
comes at the cost of having to provide information that enables the
state to enforce its tax laws.
Having determined that the statute likely discriminated against
interstate commerce, the Colorado court applied a strict standard of
review instead of the Pike balancing test."' If a court agrees with the
analysis set forth above and finds that a use tax reporting statute does
not discriminate "in the constitutionally prohibited sense,"332 the
court would apply Pike balancing review, which, unlike strict scrutiny,
is not necessarily fatal in fact. But the outcome of the balancing test
depends largely on the "weights" a court gives to the perceived
benefits and burdens of the challenged statute. Not surprisingly, given
the difficulty in applying the test, whether a reporting statute would
survive Pike balancing is hard to predict. In light of the ever-
expanding role of internet commerce in the national economy and the
fact that a tax reporting statute does not require retailers to keep
track of constantly changing tax rates and exemptions (like a tax
collection statute does), these authors believe that a court examining
a Colorado-style use tax reporting statute should uphold the statute
under a balancing test analysis. Moreover, considering the substantial
amount of unpaid use tax at stake, a use tax reporting statute is one of
the few options that states like North Carolina and Colorado have
available to increase their use tax collections. But, in this view, such a
329. DMA Injunction, supra note 236, at 11 (discussing potential irreparable harm to
out-of-state retailers if preliminary injunction not granted).
330. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623-24 (1981) (quoting
Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975)).
331. DMA Injunction, supra note 236, at 4.
332. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
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statute can survive judicial review only if its constitutionality is
determined under the Pike balancing test."'
5. The Second Basis for the DMA Court's Preliminary Injunction
Decision: The Improper Extension of Quillto Use Tax Reporting
Statutes
In addition to determining that the Colorado reporting statute
discriminated against interstate commerce, the Colorado federal
court enjoined HB 1193 for another reason: it held that the reporting
statute violated Quills physical presence standard and, therefore,
most likely placed an undue burden on interstate commerce.3 34 Under
Quill, a state may not require a retailer to collect and remit sales or
use tax if the retailer has no physical presence in the state."
Although the Colorado court acknowledged that HB 1193's reporting
requirements do not themselves constitute a tax collection obligation,
it stated:
[The reporting requirements] do require out-of-state retailers
to gather, maintain, and report information, and to provide
notices to their Colorado customers and to the [Department of
Revenue] about their Colorado customers. The sole purpose of
333. Other arguments, not presented by Colorado in the preliminary injunction
hearing, also may cause a court to subject HB 1193-or a use tax reporting statute enacted
in North Carolina-to a less rigorous standard of review than the strict scrutiny applied by
the Colorado court. In particular, Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis offers
support for the proposition that in seeking to collect unpaid taxes (through the imposition
of reporting requirements like those in HB 1193) the state is performing a "traditional
government function," and "a government function is not susceptible to standard dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny owing to its likely motivation by legitimate objectives distinct
from the simple economic protectionism the Clause abhors." 533 U.S. 328, 341 (2008). In
addition, the reporting requirement imposed on out-of-state retailers may be viewed as
"compensatory" or "complementary" charges to the sales taxes imposed on in-state
retailers. If so, the reporting requirements may come within the protection of the
"compensatory tax doctrine." The compensatory tax doctrine, as explained in Oregon
Waste Systems v. Department of Environmental Quality, allows for even a facially
discriminatory tax to survive dormant Commerce Clause review if the tax imposes on
interstate commerce "the rough equivalent of an identifiable and 'substantially similar' tax
on intrastate commerce." 511 U.S. 93, 102-03 (1994) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 758-59 (1981)). The reporting requirements impose an obligation on out-of-state
retailers that corresponds closely to the sales tax collection obligation imposed on in-state
retailers. Nevertheless, the reporting requirements are not themselves a tax, and therefore
do not fall cleanly within the existing test for determining whether the complementary tax
doctrine applies. Seeid. at 103 (providing the details of that test). Moreover, the Court has
been very reluctant to extend the complementary tax doctrine beyond the narrow confines
of justifying the constitutionality of the use tax itself. See id. at 105 n.8 (expressing the
Court's reluctance to extend its "carefully confined compensatory tax jurisprudence").
334. DMA Injunction, supra note 236, at 4-5.
335. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 311, 314 (1992).
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these requirements is to enhance the collection of use taxes by
the State of Colorado. I conclude that these requirements likely
impose on out-of-state retailers use tax-related responsibilities
that trigger the safe-harbor provisions of Quill. Although the
burden of the notice and reporting obligations imposed by the
Act and the Regulations [i.e., HB 1193 and the regulations
issued thereunder] may be somewhat different than the burden
of collecting and remitting sales and use taxes, the sole purpose
of the burdens imposed by the Act and the Regulations is the
ultimate collection of use taxes when sales taxes cannot be
collected. Looking to the practical effect of the Act and the
Regulations, I conclude that the burdens imposed by the Act
and the Regulations are inextricably related in kind and
purpose to the burdens condemned in Quil.3 6
Although the reporting requirements unquestionably relate to
the state's efforts to collect use tax, the Colorado court improperly
assumed that they impose burdens "inextricably related in kind and
purpose to the burdens condemned in Quill."33  Contrary to the
Colorado court's claim, however, the burden condemned in Quill-
imposition of a tax collection obligation in a jurisdiction where the
retailer had no physical presence-is substantively different than the
burden Colorado's use tax reporting requirements impose. In Quill,
the Court focused on the "many variations in rates of tax, in
allowable exemptions, and in administrative and record-keeping
requirements." 3 " Requiring an out-of-state retailer to collect tax
could unduly burden interstate commerce because meeting the
potential tax collection obligations in all of the "[n]ation's 6,000-plus
taxing jurisdictions" could "entangle [an out-of-state retailer] in a
virtual welter of complicated obligations." 39
To date, Colorado is the only taxing jurisdiction in the country to
enact a use tax reporting statute. 340 Although North Carolina and
other states may follow Colorado's lead, tax reporting requirements
are substantially less burdensome than the tax collection
requirements considered in Quillfor at least two reasons. First, states
336. DMA Injunction, supra note 236, at 10.
337. Id. at 5.
338. Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6.
339. Id.
340. Oklahoma has enacted a use tax notice statute, requiring out-of-state retailers
only to notify Oklahoma customers of their obligation to pay use taxes. See 2010 Okla.
Sess. Laws 412, available athttp://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?id
=459019&hits=. The Oklahoma statute does not contain the Annual Customer Report or
the Annual Retailer Report requirements contained in HB 1193. Id.
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would impose reporting requirements for the same purposes-to
inform consumers of their obligation to pay use taxes and to enable
the taxing authority to determine whether consumers are making
those payments. As a result, while there may be minor variations
between and among states, reporting requirements in other
jurisdictions invariably would seek the same information as the
Colorado statute-the names of purchasers and the total amount of
taxable purchases. Unlike the patchwork of tax collection and
remission requirements that the Court considered in Quill,34 ' the
reporting requirements would impose a generally uniform reporting
obligation on out-of-state retailers. Second, Colorado's reporting
statute permits retailers to use a generalized Annual Customer
Report if the retailer is required to provide a similar notice in other
states:
If the retailer is required by another state to provide a similar
notice [to the Annual Customer Report required by HB 1193],
and the retailer provides a single such notice to all purchasers
with respect to items purchased for delivery in all states, the
notice required [by Colorado] shall be sufficient if it contains
substantially the information required in a form that is
generalized to any state.342
To the extent that other jurisdictions allow retailers to use a
single form to satisfy the reporting requirements, states will guarantee
uniformity in the information requested from retailers, thereby
distinguishing the reporting requirements from the far more complex
and jurisdiction-specific tax collection and remission requirements
considered in Quill.
Because reporting statutes do not impose the same degree of
burden on interstate commerce as a tax collection requirement, courts
should reconsider the DMA court's extension of Quillto information
reporting statutes. Limiting Quill to tax collection is faithful to that
opinion and recognizes, as Justice Stevens put it, that the physical
presence standard was "artificial at its edges" when first imposed.34 3
With the rapid expansion of e-commerce, that "artificiality" has been
amplified, creating a substantial tax disparity between internet
341. The lack of uniformity in sales and use tax collection requirements has been
reduced significantly since Quillwith the creation of the SSUTA. See supra Part I.B.2 for
a description of the SSUTA.
342. COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-112(2)(e) (2010). The current draft of the MTC's
model use tax notice and reporting statute does not contain a comparable provision. See
SALES & USE TAX UNIFORMITY SUBCOMM., supra note 235.
343. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315.
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retailers and traditional brick-and-mortar retailers. The DMA court's
application of the physical presence standard to a reporting
requirement that does not itself impose a tax collection obligation
perpetuates that disparity and, therefore, should be rejected.
B. Possible First Amendment Problems with a North Carolina
Reporting Statute
If North Carolina adopts a Colorado-style reporting statute, then
non-collecting retailers (i.e., remote retailers that are not required to
collect sales or use taxes) would have to file an annual report with the
DOR identifying each North Carolina purchaser and specifying the
total amount of purchases that each purchaser made from that
retailer during the year. Although similar to the Amazon district
court's modified relief, the reporting statute would differ from the
court's order in two important ways. First, the reporting statute would
not require a remote retailer to provide even generic product
information, only the total amount of purchases made from the
retailer.344 Second, with a possible exception for retailers with de
minimis sales in North Carolina, the reporting statute would apply to
all retailers, not just retailers that the DOR is auditing.
Despite these differences, the general First Amendment
questions remain the same: (i) whether the reporting statute
implicates the First Amendment and, if so, (ii) whether it survives
heightened scrutiny. As discussed above, the Amazon court assumed
that its modified relief did not trigger the First Amendment rights of
North Carolina consumers."' This might cause one to think that the
reporting statute, which does not even require non-collecting retailers
to disclose generic product information, is even less likely to implicate
the First Amendment rights of consumers.
But given that the reporting statute applies to all retailers, it
raises a different First Amendment problem: overbreadth. The First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine "allows a party to whom the law
may constitutionally be applied to challenge the statute on the ground
that it violates the First Amendment rights of others."346 Therefore,
344. The Annual Retailer Report required by the Colorado reporting statute calls only
for the non-collecting retailer to report to the Colorado Department of Revenue the
name, address, and "total dollar amount of purchases made by each customer in Colorado
for the previous year." SeeCOLO. DEP'T OF REVENUE, supra note 244, at 2.
345. See supra Part I1I..
346. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1593 (2010) ("A party seeking to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute generally must show that the statute violates the
party's own rights. The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine carves out a narrow
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even assuming that a government knows that a North Carolina
taxpayer buying $400 of goods from Amazon does not chill First
Amendment activity, Amazon still could claim that the reporting
statute violates the First Amendment if the government's knowledge
that a taxpayer buying $400 of goods from another retailer does chill
First Amendment activity. Moreover, this Article contends that the
government's knowledge that a person bought $400 of items from a
publisher specializing in political, religious, sexual, or any
controversial, embarrassing, or unpopular topics does implicate the
First Amendment under Supreme Court precedent. Given the broad
protection afforded anonymity in receiving expressive materials, a
reporting statute that required specialty publishers or retailers to
divulge the identities of their customers would violate the customers'
speech rights even though the government might never know the
titles of the expressive materials or even the medium of expressive
materials purchased (e.g., books or videos).
As the Supreme Court has stated, anonymity "exemplifies the
purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in
particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation-and
their ideas from suppression-at the hand of an intolerant society."3 47
Anonymity ensures that individuals can pursue their reading and
viewing interests without having to worry about the government's
monitoring their expressive choices, which, in turn, might chill First
Amendment activity.3 48 Without anonymity, people would be afraid
of, or at least discouraged from, reading, writing, viewing, or
exception to that general rule." (internal citations omitted)); see also Bd. of Trs. of State
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 483 (1989) ("Ordinarily, the principal advantage of the
overbreadth doctrine for a litigant is that it enables him to benefit from the statute's
unlawful application to someone else."); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462
n.20 (1978) (describing the overbreadth doctrine as one "under which a person may
challenge a statute that infringes protected speech even if the statute constitutionally
might be applied to him").
347. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); see also United
States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000) ("The citizen is entitled to seek
out or reject certain ideas or influences without Government interference or control.");
Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1052 (Colo. 2002) ("Anonymity is
often essential to the successful and uninhibited exercise of First Amendment rights,
precisely because of the chilling effects that can result from disclosure of identity.").
348. As the Amazon court noted, "[c]itizens are entitled to receive information and
ideas through books, films, and other expressive materials anonymously" because without
this protection "[t]he fear of government tracking and censoring one's reading, listening,
and viewing choices chills the exercise of First Amendment rights." Amazon.com LLC v.
Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1168 (W.D. Wash. 2010). See supra Part II.A.1 for discussion of
the First Amendment's protection for receiving expressive materials anonymously and
Justice Douglas's concurrence in Rumely
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distributing expressive materials of which the government or others
might disapprove.349 Thus, as the Amazon court acknowledged with
respect to the DOR's initial request, the "chilling effect" of the
government's actions is a touchstone for First Amendment
violation. 3o
But First Amendment speech activity is chilled not only from the
government's being able to identify the particular titles that specific
individuals are reading or viewing; it is also chilled when the
government knows that particular individuals are reading or viewing
specific types of expressive materials. If a non-collecting publisher is
identified as specializing in a specific genre of expressive materials
that the government might disapprove of or the community at large
might find distasteful-e.g., militant or jihadist literature; sexually
explicit magazines, books, or movies; new age readings; or counter-
cultural literature-then permitting the government to know that a
citizen bought anything from the publisher would have the same
chilling effect on that person's speech activity as the government's
learning that the person bought a book or video of the same
disfavored genre from Amazon. If, as the Amazon court suggests, a
person may be dissuaded from buying The Communist Manifesto if
the person knows that purchase will be reported to the government,
the person might likewise hesitate to buy a book from a publisher
specializing in communist political writings if the government will
discover that he made a purchase from that publisher.
Moreover, Lamont v. Postmaster General of the United States and
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v.
FCC directly support this conclusion."' In Lamont, plaintiffs
challenged a postal regulation pursuant to which the postal service
would screen mail for certain "communist political propaganda." If a
piece of mail was determined to be communist political propaganda,
the Post Office would detain the mail and send a notice to the
addressee, identifying the mail being detained and informing the
addressee that the mail would be destroyed unless she requested
349. See, e.g., Mclntyre, 514 U.S. at 357; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482
(1965) ("The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to
print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and freedom of
inquiry." (internal citations omitted)); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (holding
that the First Amendment protects anonymity in the distribution of campaign literature);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) ("The right of freedom of speech and
press has broad scope.... This freedom embraces the right to distribute literature and
necessarily protects the right to receive it.").
350. Amazon, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
351. See supra Part II.A.1 for a prior discussion ofthese cases.
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delivery by returning an attached reply card.352 The Court struck
down the requirement on First Amendment grounds because the
identification requirement was an "unconstitutional ... limitation on
the unfettered exercise of the addressees [sic] First Amendment
rights."353 In particular, the Court emphasized the chilling effect that
the requirement would have on speech activity, noting that it was
"almost certain to have a deterrent effect, especially as respects those
who have sensitive positions."3 54 Given the political nature of the
literature and the government's singling out that type of political
literature for special treatment, "any addressee is likely to feel some
inhibition in sending for literature which federal officials have
condemned as 'communist political propaganda.' "
In Lamont, then, the deterrent effect resulted from the
government's requiring that a person identify herself before receiving
certain types of expressive materials-communist political
propaganda. Regardless of the specific titles of pamphlets or other
materials contained in the detained mail, individuals had to give
notice to the government that they wanted to receive this kind of
literature." And knowing just the type of literature-communist
propaganda-was sufficient to infringe on First Amendment values:
"Public officials like schoolteachers who have no tenure, might think
they would invite disaster if they read what the Federal Government
says contains the seeds of treason.""
The principle applied in Lamontwould seem to apply with equal
force to the government's learning that an individual received
expressive materials from publishers that specialize in certain types of
books, magazines, or videos. If a publisher or remote retailer is in the
business of selling and distributing expressive materials that are
352. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 303 (1965).
353. Id. at 305.
354. Id. at 307.
355. Id.
356. Initially, individuals receiving a notice that the government was holding
communist political propaganda could indicate that they wanted to receive "any similar
publication" going forward. Id. at 303. The Post Office, therefore, maintained a list of such
people. Id. In Lamont, the Post Office inspected the contents of the mail to determine
whether the particular literature constituted communist political propaganda. Id. at 306.
As a result, the government had access to the publications themselves and, hence, the
titles of those publications. Id at 304. But the purpose of the program was to identify and
restrict a specific category of literature, and the government's knowing who received that
type of expressive material impermissibly chilled the exercise of First Amendment rights.
Id. at 307. The Post Office subsequently stopped keeping the list but continued detaining
this type of political literature and requiring people to return a reply card to receive it. Id.
at 303.
357. Id. at 307.
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outside the mainstream or at odds with what the majority views as
acceptable, requiring those publishers to identify their customers'
names to the government would deter the First Amendment activities
of those customers. Nor should it make a constitutional difference
that, under a reporting statute, the remote retailer would provide the
purchaser's name and address instead of the individual providing that
information through a reply card as in Lamont. In either case, an
individual's receiving expressive materials from a remote publisher or
retailer would result in the government's learning that the purchaser
is reading or viewing certain kinds of expressive materials, which, in
turn, would deter First Amendment activity. As a result, under
Lamont, if North Carolina adopted a Colorado-style reporting
statute, that statute still would be "at war with the 'uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open' debate and discussion that are contemplated
by the First Amendment.""'
Similarly, in Denver Area, the Court struck down on First
Amendment grounds a statute that required individuals to identify
themselves before receiving certain broadcast programming because
of, among other things, the deterrent effect of the requirement.3 9
Under a section of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act, cable system operators were required to segregate
and block "patently offensive" sex-related programming that
appeared on leased channels.3"o Subscribers who wanted to view the
sexually themed programming had to submit a written request to
have the cable operator unblock the leased channel and, once
finished viewing, another written request to have the station
reblocked.36 ' The Court noted that this " 'written notice' requirement
[would] further restrict viewing by subscribers who fear for their
reputations should the operator, advertently or inadvertently, disclose
the list of those who wish to watch the 'patently offensive' channel."362
358. Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). As the
concurrence in Lamontnotes, the fact that a government regulation or restriction does not
expressly prohibit expressive activity does not insulate the regulation from a First
Amendment challenge. Government action can neither prohibit nor inhibit the exercise of
core First Amendment rights, such as freedom of speech, "[b]ut inhibition as well as
prohibition against the exercise of precious First Amendment rights is a power denied to
government." Id. at 309.
359. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 733
(1996).
360. 47 U.S.C. § 532(J) (1996), declared unconstitutional by Denver Area, 518 U.S. at
727.
361. DenverArea, 518 U.S. at 735 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.701(c) (1995)).
362. Id. at 754 (citing Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307). In the context of a use tax reporting
statute, consumers also may worry about the disclosure of information about their
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Stated differently, the statute threatened First Amendment
values because the cable operators did (and third-parties might) learn
that the subscriber was watching a certain type of programming,
namely "patently offensive" sex-related programming, even though
neither the cable operators nor third-parties would know the specific
titles of the programs that the subscriber viewed. Thus, although the
Court did not explicitly state that viewers (or readers) of expressive
materials have a First Amendment right to anonymity with regard to
the fact that they are reading certain kinds of materials, the Court's
focus on the deterrent effect of the government action, coupled with
the broad protection afforded First Amendment activity, suggests just
such a rule.
Accordingly, under Lamontand Denver Area, a reporting statute
cannot give the DOR or the State of North Carolina unfettered
discretion to require all remote retailers to disclose the identities of
North Carolina purchasers and the amount of their purchases.
Rather, because a Colorado-style reporting statute implicates the
First Amendment rights of consumers, the DOR must satisfy the
heightened scrutiny standard set out in the Amazon court's opinion.
That is, to obtain the names of purchasers and the amount purchased
from all non-collecting retailers, North Carolina must show a
compelling interest in that information and a substantial relation
between that interest and the particular information sought. But
given the protection afforded anonymity under Lamont and Denver
Area, the DOR cannot make the required showing. Because the
reporting statute would deter the speech activity of consumers who
purchase from specialized retailers, "[e]nforcement of this demand
would 'sacrifice First Amendment protections' for too 'speculative a
gain.' "363
North Carolina, however, might try to avoid the overbreadth
problem by distinguishing in the reporting statute between different
purchases, whether advertently or inadvertently. At least one state, Oklahoma, has been
criticized for selling its citizens' personal information and several incidents of
unintentional disclosures have also occurred. See Laptop Stolen from Connecticut State
Tax Office; Information of 106,000 at Risk, SC MAGAZINE BLOG (Aug. 29, 2007),
http://www.scmagazineus.com/laptop-stolen-from-connecticut-state-tax-office-information
-of-106000-at-risk/article/154986/ (noting that a laptop containing the tax information of
over 100,000 Connecticut citizens was stolen); Paul Monies, Oklahoma Brings in Millions
by SellingPersonalData, NEWSOK (Apr. 5, 2010, 1:51 PM), http://blog.newsok.com
/politics/2010/04/05/oklahoma-brings-in-millions-by-selling-personal-data/
(discussing Oklahoma's sale of driver's license information).
363. Lubin v. Agora, Inc., 882 A.2d 833, 847 (Md. 2005) (quoting CBS v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973)).
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types of retailers-"general" retailers and "specialized" retailers.36
The state would have to argue that the chilling effect on speech is not
present when a "general" retailer such as Amazon discloses the
identity of a particular person and the fact that that person spent a
certain amount on purchases from Amazon. Given that Amazon sells
books, videos, tools, cameras, toys, and a variety of other products,
the government's knowing that a person bought a certain amount of
items from Amazon is constitutionally different from knowing that
the person bought a specific book. With a retailer like Amazon, the
government lacks the ability to connect the individual to any
expressive materials, let alone to a particular title. Accordingly, the
government's requirement of general retailers to provide such
information would not chill the First Amendment activity of
Amazon's consumers. On the other hand, if a retailer like Penthouse,
Quakerbooks.org, or Jihadiliterature.com has to report even the
amount of purchases a particular individual made, the government
obtains important information about the purchaser's reading or
viewing habits. Under Lamont and Denver Area, the government's
knowledge or disclosure of even the fact of purchasing from these or
other specialized retailers might deter individuals from exercising
their "unfettered" First Amendment right to receive expressive
materials."'
Of course, the difficulty comes in trying to define the distinction
between "general" and "specialized" non-collecting retailers in a way
that is not unconstitutionally vague. Amazon provides a relatively
clear example of a general retailer-it sells all varieties of expressive
and non-expressive materials. Quakerbooks.com exemplifies a
"specialized" retailer-it sells books focused on Quaker beliefs. But
how should the state classify Barnes & Noble, which sells an extensive
variety of almost exclusively expressive materials? Are bookstores
"general" retailers because they carry all sorts of books or would they
be exempt from reporting requirements under the "subjective
concern" standard that the Wisconsin district court adopted in In re
Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon?366 Alternatively, how many non-
364. These authors use the term "general" retailers to mean those that sell all types of
goods, perhaps including expressive materials on a variety of topics. With respect to
"specialized" retailers, these authors mean those that focus their sales on certain types of
expressive materials, e.g., political, sexually-themed, countercultural, or religious
literature.
365. In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com, 246 F.R.D. 570, 573 (W.D. Wis.
2007)).
366. See supra text accompanying notes 214-19 for an explanation of the "subjective
concern" standard adopted in WI Grand Jury
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expressive products must a retailer specializing in sexually-themed
products sell to qualify as a general retailer? Numerous other
questions arise when one considers how to distinguish "general"
retailers from "specialized" retailers.367
Given that Colorado is the first state to enact a reporting statute,
the courts have not, as yet, had to address these issues. In light of its
current budget problems, North Carolina should continue pursuing
additional ways to improve use tax compliance, including the possible
enactment of a Colorado-style reporting statute. North Carolina's
version, though, should distinguish expressly between general and
specialized non-collecting retailers to avoid the First Amendment
problems discussed above because, if nothing else, Amazon has
shown that it is willing to assert and defend the First Amendment
rights of its customers.
CONCLUSION
North Carolina has been proactive in trying to address the
problem of use tax delinquency. Even so, North Carolina's efforts to
date have seen only limited success and, in the case of the click-
through Amazon law, actually may have cost the state revenue. But
with e-commerce continuing to expand and use tax compliance at less
than four percent (which amounts to more than $160 million in
unpaid use taxes each year), North Carolina should continue seeking
new ways to recapture these lost revenues.
The Washington district court's opinion in Amazon provides
North Carolina with one avenue-audit a remote retailer and request
the names and general product information of consumers as part of
that audit. This strategy raises a unique First Amendment question:
whether the First Amendment limits the state's ability to gather
information about use tax compliance when the consumer purchases
expressive materials. As we have explained, the constitutionality of
this strategy likely depends upon whether the government's request
chills the First Amendment speech activity of North Carolina
consumers. But, to date, no court has articulated a clear test for
making this determination. Thus, North Carolina must be ready to
explain why such a request does not deter expressive activity and,
367. For example, if a publisher of political propaganda sells clothing or home
decorations, would this be sufficient to- remove the chilling effect of the government's
learning about a taxpayer's purchases from that publisher? Or would purchasers still
worry-and therefore change their online purchasing habits-if the government knows
that they are purchasing anything from retailers specializing in identifiable political,
religious, or sexual themes?
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consequently, avoids the First Amendment problems that plagued its
general request for "all information" about North Carolina
purchasers.
Given the time and expense of audits, coupled with the DOR's
desire to recover more of the unpaid use taxes, we believe that North
Carolina should pursue two other courses of action to improve use
tax compliance. First, North Carolina should consider adopting a
Colorado-style reporting statute. Although this option is not without
risk, it gives the DOR the means to learn both the identities of North
Carolinians who make online purchases and the total amounts of
those purchases, thereby enabling the DOR to determine each
consumer's use tax liability. Such a statute undoubtedly would
confront dormant Commerce Clause and First Amendment
challenges, but North Carolina has ways to respond to these
constitutional claims.
With respect to the dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme
Court's recent decisions suggest a more lenient approach toward
statutes that provide disparate treatment to in-state and out-of-state
economic interests where those economic interests are not "similarly
situated." Given that in-state retailers are required to collect sales tax
at the time of sale and out-of-state retailers are not, the retailers are
not similarly situated. Moreover, Quills antiquated physical presence
standard, adopted at a time when internet commerce was in its
infancy, should not be expanded to preclude uniform reporting
requirements that require remote retailers to disclose information
that they already maintain.
Furthermore, a carefully drafted reporting statute might avoid
the First Amendment problems that threaten the Colorado statute.
Although the First Amendment protects a citizen's right to receive
expressive materials anonymously, North Carolina should draft its
reporting statute to avoid chilling a purchaser's willingness to make
purchases from retailers specializing in expressive materials that
relate to private, controversial, embarrassing, or unpopular issues or
topics. In particular, North Carolina should distinguish between
specialized retailers and general retailers, such as Amazon, that sell a
variety of expressive and non-expressive items. While such a
distinction would be subject to a vagueness challenge, it would give
the DOR a way to obtain tax-related information from most remote
retailers and not only from Amazon.
Second, given that a reporting statute will not close the use tax
gap completely, North Carolina and other states should continue
trying to convince Congress to exercise its Commerce Clause
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authority and to reverse Quills antiquated physical presence
standard. This would level the playing field between in-state and out-
of-state retailers by allowing the states to require Amazon and other
remote internet retailers to collect the use tax without implicating
First Amendment or dormant Commerce Clause problems.
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